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I. INTRODUCTION
On September 21, 1983, President Ronald Reagan asked for the advice and
consent of the Senate to the ratification of the United Nations Convention on Con-
tracts for the International Sale of Goods (Convention).' The Convention contains a
comprehensive set of rules governing the formation, performance, and remedies for
failure of contracts for the sale of goods within its jurisdictional scope. To put it in
familiar terms, the Convention contains the functional equivalent of Article 2 of the
Uniform Commercial Code (UCC), to be applied worldwide to sales between persons
with places of business in different nations. Where it applies, the Convention will
displace local and national rules. 2 The Convention reserves an uncertain number of
issues for national law, and in addition seeks to preserve the private autonomy of
contracting parties and permits them to exclude by agreement the application of the
Convention or any of its provisions. 3
The Convention is the product of more than two generations of international
negotiation, which has produced a document unanimously approved by delegations
representing sixty-two national legal systems at a diplomatic conference convened by
the United Nations General Assembly in Vienna in 1980.' This must be seen as a
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I. Final Act of the United Nations Conference on Contracts for the International Sale of Goods, Apr. 10, 1980,
U.N. Doc. A/Conf. 97118, with Annex, United Nations Convention on Contracts for the International Sale of Goods,
reprinted in 19 I.L.M. 668 (1980) [hereinafter cited as Convention]. See President's Message to the Senate Transmitting
the Convention, 19 VEEKLY COMP. PREs. Doc. 1290 (Sept. 21, 1983) [hereinafter cited as President's Message].
2. A number of transactions are excluded from articles 2-5 of the Convention, for example, consumer sales and
claims of personal injury. Article 28 limits the remedy of specific performance to those cases in which it is available under
domestic law. Under article 12 contracting states that require contracts to be in writing may insist on enforcing their
domestic law. Article 92 permits contracting states to exclude, at the time of accession, part I of the Convention, dealing
with formation of the contract, or part Ill of the Convention, dealing with performance and remedies. The application of
the Convention is limited in important but uncertain ways by provisions of article 4 restricting the Convention's applica-
tion to the "obligations of the seller and the buyer arising from such a contract." This would appear to exclude the interests
of third parties in the transaction. Article 4 also declares that the Convention is "not concerned with ... the validity of the
contract or of any of its provisions or of any usage." The term "validity" is of uncertain scope, but would appear to
encompass much of what in American law is included under the rubrics of illegality, fraud, duress, unconscionability, and
mistake, as well as the mandatory provisions of law that limit the parties' power to set their own rules by exercise of
private autonomy. A final example of the preservation of domestic law is contained in article 35, dealing with conformity
of goods, which to an indeterminate extent appears to incorporate the expectations of fitness and merchantability found in
domestic law. See J. HONNOLD, UNIFORMi LAW FOR INTERNATIONAL SALES UNDER THE 1980 UNITED NATIoNs CONVEN-
nON §§ 256-266 (1982).
3. Article 6 of the Convention provides: "The parties may exclude the application of this Convention or, subject to
article 12, derogate from or vary the effect of any of its provisions." Convention, sapra note 1, art. 6.
4. Official Records of the United Nations Conference on Contracts for the International Sale of Goods, art. 6, Mar.
10, 1980, U.N. Doc. A/Conf. 97/19.
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monumental achievement of the United Nations Conference on International Trade
Law (UNCITRAL), under whose auspices it was drafted. Since its adoption the
Convention also has received the approval of groups of lawyers all over the world,
including the American Bar Association.5 Little opposition has arisen to its ratifica-
tion by the United States, and from all indications the reaction in other nations also
has been very positive. 6
Harmonization of the law of sales for the whole world is attractive, in large part
because of compelling economic and political realities. The pressures that over the
past generation have produced harmonization and unification of commercial law in
the United States, Scandinavia, and Europe, 7 as well as an impressive collection of
specialized international legal regimes, 8 call for a more global and comprehensive
response. Commercial law has deep roots in international regimes. 9 Innovations in
transportation, communications, and technology have contributed over the past cen-
tury to a large measure of legal order supporting worldwide commerce. 10 A very
5. At its August 1981 meeting the House of Delegates of the ABA recommended that the United States sign and
ratify the Convention. 1981 SUMMARY OF AcTION TAKEN BY THE HOUSE OF DELEGATES OF THE AMERICAN BAR
ASSOCIATION 25.
6. In October 1983 the Secretary of UNCITRAL reported that the Convention had already been ratified by six
states: Argentina, Egypt, France, Hungary, Lesotho, and Syria. Among the bodies around the world that are reported to
have urged its adoption are the Council of Mutual Economic Assistance (CMEA), the Asia-African Consultative Com-
mittee, LAWASIA, and the International Chamber of Commerce. K. Sono, Remarks at the International Conference on
the United Nations Convention on Contracts for the International Sale of Goods 6-7 (Parker School of Foreign and
Comparative Law, Columbia University, Oct. 21, 1983) [hereinafter cited as 1983 Parker School Conference]. The
proceedings of the conference are to be published.
7. The Uniform Commercial Code and the Scandinavian Sale of Goods Act provide models for regional harmoniza-
tion. The major harmonization of laws of the members of the European Economic Community under articles 100 and 220
of the Treaty of Rome are described in 3 H. SMIT & P. HERZOG, THE LAW OF THE EUROPEAN ECONOMIC COMMUNrrY
3-469 to -517 (1976 & Supp. 1982) and 5 H. SMIT & P. HERZOG, supra, at 6-135 to -158.
8. For more than half a century the carriage of goods by sea has been governed throughout the world by the Hague
Rules, a convention adopted by at least 85 nations and incorporated in the laws of the United States as the Carriage of
Goods by Sea Act, 46 U.S.C. §§ 1300-1315 (1976 & Supp. V 1981). World practice on letters of credit is heavily
influenced by the Uniform Customs and Practice for Documentary Credits promulgated by the International Chamber of
Commerce that is effectively universal law by its incorporation in most bank letter of credit contracts. INTERNATIONAL
CHAMBER OF COMMERCE, PUB. No. 290, UNIFORM CUSTOMS AND PRACTICE FOR DOCUMENTARY CREDITS (1974). The
legal relationships between air carriers and both passengers and cargo consignors is governed by the Warsaw Convention
(opened for signature Oct. 12, 1929, 49 Stat. 3000, T.S. No. 876, 137 L.N.T.S. 11), while services performed by
individuals other than the contracting air carrier are governed by the Guadalajara Convention (opened for signature Sept.
18, 1961, 500 U.N.T.S. 31). The carriage of goods by road carriers throughout Europe is governed in most nations,
including several Eastern European socialist states, by the Convention on the Contract for the International Carriage of
Goods by Road (opened for signature May 19, 1956, 399 U.N.T.S. 189). Contracts for particular transactions are
harmonized by nodel and standard form agreements drafted by national and regional trade associations, industry groups,
and the United Nations Economic Commission for Europe. Large international construction contracts are heavily in-
fluenced by Conditions of Contract (International)for Works of Civil Engineering Construction (Fidration Internationale
des Ingdnieurs-Conseils) (3d. ed. 1977), otherwise known as the FIDIC Contract, which has been approved by pro-
fessional organizations in 73 nations. See generally C. SCHMrrrstoFF, EXPORT TRADE chs. 3 & 27 (7th ed. 1980); Sand,
The International Unification of Air Law, 30 LAw & CONTEMP. PROBS. 400 (1965); Yiannopoulos, The Unification of
Private Maritime Lair by International Conventions, 30 LAw & CONTEMP. PROBS. 370 (1965).
9. G. GILMORE & C. BLACK, JR., THE LAW OF ADMIRALTY I-11 (2d ed. 1975). See Berman, The Uniform Law on
International Sale of Goods: A Constructive Critique, 30 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 354 (1965); Berman & Kaufman, The
Lai of International Commercial Transactions (Lex Mereatoria), 19 HARV. INT'L L.J. 221 (1978); Note, A Modern Lex
Mereatoria: Political Rhetoric or Substantive Progress?, 3 BROOKLYN J. INT'L L. 210 (1977).
10. See David, Tile International Unification of Private Law, 2 INTERNATIONAL ENCYCLOPEDIA OF COMPARATIVE
LAW 209-12 (1972); Nadelmann, The United States Joins tile Hague Conference on Private International Law: A
"History" vith Comments, 30 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 291 (1965) [hereinafter cited as Nadelmann, Hague Con-
ference]; Nadelmann, Ignored State Interests: The Federal Government and International Efforts to Unify Rules of Private
Law, 102 U. PA. L. REv. 323 (1954) [hereinafter cited as Nadelmann, Ignored State Interests]; Rabel, A Draft of an
International Law of Sales, 5 U. CHI. L. REV. 543 (1938).
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significant part of most nations' gross domestic product results from international
transactions." The interdependent structure of the world economy suggests that a
harmonious, if not unified, set of legal rules should govern transactions all over the
world. Unification of the law also makes a positive political statement, giving con-
crete form to hopes for one peaceful family of nations living under a compatible legal
order. 12
Despite the lofty goals of the project, the impressive talent of the drafters, the
long period of gestation, and the universal acclaim with which the Convention has
been met, a number of significant questions have been largely unaddressed in discus-
sion of the Convention thus far. This Article will suggest that these matters should be
evaluated carefully before the United States ratifies the Convention. In addition to
making some specific critical comments on the Convention, this Article will suggest
that the basic strategy of attempting to create one exclusive and comprehensive
statement of world contract law is ill-conceived. World law harmonization and world
law codification are not identical, and the goal of harmonizing the legal treatment of
common transactions throughout the world may not be advanced best by the adoption
of the Convention in its present form. These reservations do not extend to other
projects undertaken by UNCITRAL or to other efforts at law harmonization among
nations. In the decade and a half since it was established, UNCITRAL has made
remarkable progress and produced admirable harmonization in the rules governing
recognition of arbitration procedures and awards, model contracts for large-scale
industrial projects, and financial transfers.' 3
At the outset, it is important to review briefly the history of the Convention.
During the half century of the Convention's gestation the world, the nature of trade,
and the relationships among the world's legal cultures have changed so radically that
the goals of the Convention have been transformed, perhaps contributing to its crucial
weakness. In short, this project may have made sense in the Eurocentric environment
of 1928, but it no longer does. More importantly, this Article will suggest that the
perspective of harmonization based on a unified and exclusive statement of con-
ceptual norms is not likely to serve the legal needs of the future.
The present Convention is a direct result of a project begun at the Sixth Session
of the Hague Conference on Private International Law in 1928.14 All of the initial
participants were industrialized, capitalist, Western European governments, and the
draft that emerged in the mid-1930s was specific to their legal culture. The project
was swallowed by the turmoil that led to World War II. When the project was
11. See generally R. COOPER, THE ECONOMICS OF INTERDEPENDENCE (1980).
12. The author's experience with the Convention illustrates these attractions. As a teacher of both contract law and
international business transactions, the author was aware of the draft Convention, but became familiar with the provisions
of the Convention in detail only during the spring of 1983, when he was privileged to offer a short course on contract and
commercial law to students at the law department of Zhongshang University, Guangzhou, People's Republic of China.
Since China and the United States are both signatories, the Convention seemed a particularly appropriate vehicle for
instruction. The use of a common text reduced political and cultural sensitivites to foreign and capitalistic law. It was a
heady experience studying law with students from a very different legal, political, and social background on the basis of a
mutually acceptable statement of rules that were not just those of China or America but of the world.
13. UNCITRAL's first decade was celebrated by a symposium containing articles that fully describe its work.
Unification of International Trade Law: .INClTRAL's First Decade, 27 AM. J. COMP. L. 201 (1979).
14. The history is traced in Honnold, A Uniform Law for International Sales, 107 U. PA. L. Rev. 299, 302-03
(1959), and Nadelmann, Ignored State Interests, supra note 10.
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resumed in the early 1950s, the number of participants had grown to twenty. Japan
was represented, and the United States and several Latin-American countries sent
observers. 15 This phase of the effort produced two conventions, the Uniform Law on
International Sale of Goods (ULIS) 16 and the Uniform Law on the Formation of
Contracts for the International Sale of Goods (ULF), 17 which have been adopted by
several countries, predominantly in Western Europe. 18 Beginning in 1968, the task of
unification was taken over by UNCITRAL, and the number of participants grew to
sixty-two. The broader membership now includes states with socialist, centrally
planned economies, as well as capitalistic, free market economies; representatives of
less developed nations from the "southern" half of the world participate alongside
representatives of the industrialized "North."
This brief history suggests the difficulty of the task and the inevitability of
textual problems. The Convention of necessity is a compromise between the long
held doctrinal tenets of the common-law system and the civil-law systems; between
individualistic, captalistic systems and collectivistic, socialistic systems; between
developed, industrial societies and underdeveloped societies seeking a new in-
ternational economic order. American experience with national harmonization of
contract and commercial law through the American Law Institute's Restatements and
the UCC, as well as European experience with a generation of harmonization of
national economic law under the aegis of the European Economic Community (EEC),
all show how perilous this process can be, even among contiguous nations and states
with common cultural and economic experiences and circumstances. The central aim
of this Article is, however, not to demonstrate flaws in the drafting of the Conven-
tion, but to consider three general issues presented by the Convention and the method
of accession proposed by the Administration.
A. Legal Harmonization Through Unification of the Law Governing International
Transactions as a Value and as a Strategy
The Convention does not seek to harmonize the national commercial laws of
signatory nations. Instead, it tries to isolate from the body of commercial law a
special subset, the international sale, and create a unified set of rules for that group of
transactions. This creates harmony at one level but new problems at another. Only if
it is feasible in practice to cordon off the area of international sales from other
commercial transactions will it be worthwhile to unify the rules without regard to the
15. INTERNATIONAL INsTITUTE FOR THE UNIFICATION OF PRIVATE LAW, 4 UNIFICATION OF LAW 31 (1953-1955);
Rabel, The Hague Conference on the Unification of Sales Law, I AM. J. COMP. L. 58 (1952).
16. Convention Relating to a Uniform Law on the International Sale of Goods, opened for signature July 1, 1964,
834 U.N.T.S. 107, with Annex, Uniform Law on the International Sale of Goods, reprinted in 13 AM. J. Comp. L. 453
(1964) and 3 I.LM. 855 (1964) [hereinafter cited as ULIS].
17. Convention Relating to a Uniform Law on the Formation of Contracts for the International Sale of Goods,
opened for signature July 1, 1964, 834 U.N.T.S. 169, with Annex, Uniform Law on the Formation of Contracts for the
International Sale of Goods, reprinted in 13 AM. J. COMF. L. 472 (1964) and 3 I.L.M. 864 (1964) [hereinafter cited as
ULF].
18. As of 1977, ULIS had been adopted by eight nations, Belgium, the Federal Republic of Germany, the United
Kingdom, Gambia, Israel, Italy, the Netherlands, and San Marino, while ULF had been adopted by the same nations, with
the exception of Israel. Honnold, The Draft Convention on Contracts for the International Sale of Goods: An Overview,
27 AM. J. COmp. L. 223, 224 n.7 (1979).
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effect on transactions that will continue to be governed by domestic law. Yet experi-
ence with both ULIS and with the Convention make it obvious that the distinction
between domestic and international transactions is significantly flawed. The very
interconnectedness of domestic and international economies that motivates the effort
to harmonize contract law demonstrates that the international transaction often is
neither functionally nor definitionally distinct from other sales.
Experience with an unsatisfactory ULIS definition of transactions that are in-
ternational and therefore within the scope of the law's application caused the drafters
of the new Convention to strike out in a different direction. The Convention's juris-
dictional articles do not use the word "international," but rather define the coverage
of the Convention in terms of the place of business of the parties to the sales
transaction. Two identical transactions will be governed by different sets of legal
rules, with different allocations of common business risks, even though they involve
identical goods, parties of the same nationality, and identical places of formation,
shipment, and performance. Part II of this Article will suggest, as the supporters of
the Convention concede, that the concept of principal place of business carries with it
substantial factual and definitional uncertainties, the resolution of which are likely
not to be known by the parties at the time of contract formation. In a number of
common business situations, it will be difficult for the businesspersons involved to be
certain at the time they enter into transactions whether the Convention or an alterna-
tive set of national rules, such as the UCC in the United States, governs the transac-
tion. Since presumably the application of the Convention will make a substantive
difference, this difficulty poses a serious problem.' 9
Moreover, in the United States, the distinction between local, as opposed to
interstate and international, transactions is embodied in the jurisdictional and con-
stitutional allocations of power between state and federal governments. Part IV will
give special attention to the incompatibility of the competencies delineated in the
Convention and the successful structure of constitutionally mandated divisions of
power in this country.
B. Harmonization by Diplomatically Negotiated Conventions and Legal Certainty
The Convention proceeds from the correct assumption that undesirable costs are
associated with the special uncertainties of international transactions. Undoubtedly,
special costs and risks attend doing business over a distance with strangers who live
in what is likely to be an unfamiliar political regime. Perhaps too simplistically, the
Convention's approach identifies these uncertainties with the existence of separate
national statements of legal rules and seeks a solution based on a unified statement of
norms. Yet experience suggests that the law governing international transactions can
be substantially harmonized without disturbing national legal systems.
More importantly, the drafters of the Convention have treated legal uncertainty
as a function of the existence of divergent statements of the substantive norm. Yet
despite the identity of the texts stating the norm, great uncertainty often will persist
19. This problem has been recognized by Professor Honnold, who suggests that in cases of doubt the parties include
a provision in the sales contract excluding the jurisdiction of the Convention. J. HONNOLD, supra note 2, § 42, at 80.
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because of different understandings of the meanings of the terms used. Even greater
uncertainties arise because of different ways used to find the operative facts or the
legal significance to be attached to those events. In the modem context, the un-
certainty of commercial transactions appears much less likely to be the result of
differences in legal norms than of doubts regarding the fairness and reliability for
foreigners of national institutions of dispute resolution and of the structures for
enforcement of rights. The Convention does not appear to recognize the reality that
identical wording of a legal norm in various jurisdictions does not preclude un-
certainty resulting from different understandings and applications in practice.
These problems raise doubts about the ability of the Convention to reduce
significantly legal uncertainty in international transactions. While the Convention
provides a unified statement of contract law, it arrived at this apparent unity through
provisions that obscure divergent positions. The problem with this approach is that
the result, like so many compromises, is difficult to apply in concrete cases.
The process by which agreement was reached at Vienna testifies to the complex-
ity of the task and suggests the salient characteristics of the product. The delegates of
the sixty-two participating nations did not reach consensus by a magical process. The
majority, representing nations that follow the civil-law tradition, did not suddenly
realize the virtues of the common-law approach to contract and commercial transac-
tions. Nor did the representatives of states with planned socialist economies suddenly
recognize the virtues of free enterprise and the private allocation of risks by contract.
And the many representatives of poorer and underdeveloped nations did not come to a
new appreciation of the plight of the wealthy creditors of this world. After thirty years
of hard technical negotiation by experts, worldwide agreement was reached by di-
plomatic compromise. This is hardly suprising, nor is it a vice. Nonetheless, the
diplomat's drive to be inclusive and reach an agreement on the text of a treaty is at
odds with the needs of the primary user of this particular Convention, the
businessperson who has to make transactional decisions. Businesspersons do not
place a high value on doctrinal purity nor do they especially value the political
capacity to accommodate persistently conflicting views in an acceptable diplomatic
text. They do need to set prices and undertake risks; hence, they need legal guidance
in responding to particular situations.
Simply stated, too often the Convention does not resolve differences. Instead, as
part III of this Article will illustrate, it glosses them over or buries them in layers of
rhetoric. Or if the two sides cannot agree, the text uses a new term whose meaning is
not made clear. Or one article may follow one approach while another article takes a
divergent or contradictory approach. Or two different subparts of a given article may
take opposite tacks.
Despite the triumph of producing a unified statement of international com-
mercial law, the Convention does not bespeak a unified understanding of commercial
law. Unfortunately,,a unified statement of rules does not guarantee, nor even inevi-
tably advance, a unified approach to substantive problems. If the rules are understood
differently, differing results will be reached. More significantly, the interpreter of the
Convention is left at sea without the anchor of a coherent conceptual framework in
which to understand specific provisions of the Convention and without any clear
[Vol. 45:265
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sense of what the drafters meant beyond wanting to soften the conflict of opposing
viewpoints with a new verbal formula. The interpreter is also cast adrift from the
security of the national traditions of commercial law which often supplied the basis
on which gaps in understanding could be filled.
Harmonization of diverse laws is only one function of international unification
of law. Legal unification has long been a half sister of law reform. Through in-
ternational harmonization the anomolies of municipal law can be excised or reduced.
Consideration of uniform laws provides an opportunity to reconsider domestic laws
that call for revision. A major function of the unification of world commercial law is
to free sales law from what Professor Ernst Rabel described thirty years ago as the
"awesome relics from the dead past."'20 In this respect the Convention appears to be a
missed opportunity, for it is hard to find many substantive areas in which even its
partisans perceive its formulations as a significant improvement on familiar national
solutions. More seriously perhaps, in a number of areas ripe for reform the Conven-
tion masks persistent disagreement among legal systems with provisions that are so
obscurely drafted that they give no guidance at all on substance.2 1 The appropriate
question is whether adoption of the Convention will alleviate difficulties in the
present state of world trade law.
C. The Convention and Mechanisms for Future Legal Growth
Unification and harmonization of the law are not the same as nationalization, or
in this case, internationalization. Law can be harmonized without distorting the
traditional allocations of legislative jurisdiction. The UCC is the law of the United
States for virtually all practical purposes, but Congress has not enacted it as national
law. Volumes of other kinds of harmonized state law testify to this capacity in the
United States.22 In Europe, a generation of experience with harmonization under the
directive power of the EEC conferred by the Treaty of Rome also demonstrates this
basic premise.2 3 Harmonization is not always neat or speedy, but it is possible. It is
worthwhile because of the costs associated with shifting long-standing, successful
legislative competence from one government to another. Part IV of this Article will
discuss two of these costs: the new repository of legislative power may not be
equipped to deal effectively with the responsibility it inherits, and the change may be
20. Rabel, supra note 15, at 61.
21. Article 79, for example, provides excuses from contract performance because of supervening events that
interfere with the contract. Convention, supra note 1, art. 79.
Professor Gyula Errsi, of the University of Budapest and president of the 1980 diplomatic conference that adopted
the Convention, described article 79 as an instance in which "both 'parties' agreed in the hope that their doctrinal
interpretation would be reflected in the practice of the Convention." He goes on to suggest that this "does not bridge the
gap, only covers it up. The piquancy of the [compromise on article 79] is that in practice there is no gap, only in theory."
E6rsi, A Propos the 1980 Vienna Convention on Contracts for the International Sale of Goods, 31 AM. J. COMP. L. 333,
355 (1983). See also Nicholas, Force Majeure and Frustration. 27 AM. J. COMP. L. 231 (1979) (discussing article 74 of
ULIS, supra note 16, a provision comparable to article 79 of the Convention).
22. See the 14 volumes of Uniform Laws Annotated (U.L.A.), prepared under the joint sponsorship of the American
Law Institute and the National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws.
23. See B ENCYCL. oF EUR. CoMm. L. (Swe-r & MAXWELL 1974) for three volumes of European Community
treaties and C ENCYCL. OF EUR. COMM. L. (SWEET & MAXWELL 1975) for six volumes of European Community
secondary legislation; H. SMrr & P. HEzoG, supra note 7.
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a one-way street preventing further changes if the results are not as hoped. A question
of prime importance is whether ratification of the Convention is irrevocable, preclud-
ing both effective ongoing adjustment of the law by local and national interpretation
and amendment to correct drafting weaknesses and meet new circumstances.
Part IV of this Article will discuss some of the foreseeable difficulties that will
arise from the Convention's approach to interpretation and amendment and that will
inhibit both continued common-law development and local or national legislation.
This process may be irrevocable in the sense that national and local processes for
interpretation and amendment will be displaced and the federal government will be
under an international obligation not to go its own way. If the Convention proves
unsuccessful, it is likely to prove very difficult as a practical and legal matter to
unwind these international commitments and reinstall state competence over this
subject matter. The Convention leaves little room for variation in national interpreta-
tion. Each signatory is obliged to follow the interpretation of the others, although the
process for selecting those national decisions that are to be emulated by the other
signatories is not made clear.24
These interpretative difficulties are particularly troubling since most of the par-
ticipants in the Convention have legal systems that do not accord court decisions the
dispositive authority which they possess in the common-law system. In the absence
of residual national legislative competence and oversight, the correction of errors,
amendments, and incremental reforms in sales law governed by the Convention can
be accomplished only by a return to the negotiation process. This mechanism has
obvious flaws. First, UNCITRAL is committed to decisions by unanimity;2 5 that
commitment is a simple concession to necessity, for UNCITRAL possesses authority
to make decisions only by reports and recommendations to other UN organs. It
follows that changes are possible only if nobody disagrees or if nobody considers
them useful as a hostage for forcing other changes. Thus, it is unlikely that the
Convention will grow organically into a new coherent body of law. The fifty years of
international negotiations that led to this Convention should demonstrate the great
difficulty of reaching consensus and of obtaining amendments and clarifications. This
process is not likely to encourage experimentation and growth.
The Convention would represent a major displacement by federal and in-
ternational law of what has heretofore been a body of state law in the United States.
Yet the proposed process of adopting the Convention is simple approval by two-thirds
of the Senate under the treaty power without implementing legislation. Some may
24. Convention, supra note 1, art. 7(1). See J. HONNOLD, supra note 2, § 92, at 120.
25. The Chairman recalled that the Commission [on International Trade Law], at its first session, had agreed
that its decisions should, as far as possible, be reached by consensus, and that it was only in the absence of
consensus that decisions should be taken by a vote as provided for in the rules of procedure relating to the
procedure of Committees of the General Assembly.
The decisions taken by the Commission in the course of its third session were all reached by consensus.
Report of the United Nations Commission on International Trade Law on the Work of Its Third Session to the General
Assembly, 15-16, 25 U.N. GAOR Supp. (No. 17), U.N. Doe. A/8017 (1970), reprinted in 11968-70] 1 Y.B. INT'L
TRADE L. COMM'N 129, 132, U.N. Doc, AICN.9/SER.AI1970.
Professor Honnold reported that, as of 1979, UNCITRAL had yet to take a formal vote or adopt its own procedural
rules and noted that "the procedures bear a striking resemblance to those of a Quaker meeting." Honnold, The United
Nations Commission on International Trade Law: Mission and Methods, 27 AM. J. Cotp. L. 201, 210 (1979).
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find it ironic that a national administration that has been so vociferous in its defense
of state and local, rather than national, control of affairs has chosen to excise a large
and successful area of state rulemaking by this process of lawmaking. Congress as a
whole will not consider the substance of the Convention. Yet ratification would put
into place a new body of national law different from that produced by several centu-
ries of state lawmaking and harmonized nationally through the adoption of the UCC.
While international trade has always been within the legislative jurisdiction of the
federal government, the Convention would shift the center of gravity in lawmaking
sharply away from the states toward more remote and probably less competent
national and international lawmaking bodies.
The organizational provisions of the Convention and the process of interpreta-
tion it contemplates are weak in these respects and do not adequately address the need
to nurture growth of the law and the clarification of open questions. Moreover, the
process of adoption by the Senate does unnecessary violence to successful and es-
tablished American juridical processes, the balance between local and national gov-
ernment, and the possibility of correcting errors by revision and amendment. The
process contemplated would commit the United States to the regime established by
the Convention with little possibility of returning to the existing flexible system of
state law. The existing system of commercial law in this country has been notably
open to creative growth, yet the Convention would replace it with a rigid process that
effectively will preclude restoring the status quo if the international experiment
proves unsatisfactory.
II. THE TRANSACTIONAL SCOPE OF THE CONVENTION
A clear, unambiguous, and simple definition of the Convention's jurisdictional
scope is crucial to the success of the whole enterprise. The strategy of the Convention
is not to harmonize all commerical law, but only a particular subgroup of transac-
tions, the international sale. Within that subgroup, unified international rules are
supreme and displace national rules. But the residual national laws remain in force for
all transactions not within the definitional scope of the Convention. Viewed from the
perspective of an international law scholar, the law of international transactions is
harmonized by this approach. Yet viewed from the perspective of the ultimate user,
the businessperson engaged in transactions, the rules appear more complex, for the
familiar rules of domestic law now must compete with a new and different set of
laws.26 This becomes a serious problem if the standards indicating which set of rules
applies are not clear.
If the drafters had adopted a different strategy, the jurisdictional definitions
might not be so crucial. For instance, if a harmonized set of rules were created for all
sales transactions throughout the world, or for those of a certain size, or only for
26. Professor Peter Winship has informed the author that this point, like so many in the field, was first suggested
many years ago by Professor Ernst Rabel. See Rabel, International Sales Law, in LECTURES ON THE CONFLICT OF LAWS
AND INTERNATIONAL CONTRACTS AND COMPARATIVE LAW 34, 36-37 (Summer Institute on International and Comparative
Law, University of Michigan Law School) (1951).
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those as to which the parties decided they would apply, 27 the definitional lines could
be less clear without threatening the transactional security of the parties.
Presumably, the drafters intended to have the Convention apply only to in-
ternational transactions. After all, the title of the document states that it is a "Con-
vention on Contracts for the International Sale of Goods," although significantly the
word "international" does not appear anywhere in the text of the articles that define
the Convention's scope. 28 The omission of the magic word is not simply an over-
sight, for the definition of the transactional scope of the law was an issue for decades.
The unsatisfactory nature of the jurisdictional definition in ULIS was one of the first
problems to which UNCITRAL turned its attention in the late 1960s. 29 A variety of
proposals were offered during the decade of work on the new Convention. Yet
despite this effort, the solution of the new Convention may be distinctly inferior to the
imperfect solution of ULIS two decades earlier.
A. The International Character of a Transaction
Article I of ULIS3 ° provides a good starting point for determining what con-
stitutes an international contract. ULIS bases jurisdiction on the parties having a place
of business in different countries and the presence of one or more of the following
factors: the movement of the goods across borders during the transaction, the forma-
tion of the contract by international communications, or the ultimate delivery of the
goods in a country other than that in which the contract was formed. 3' This definition
rests on two broad indicators of the international character of a transaction. First, the
27. See article V of ULIS:
Any State may, at the time of the deposit of its instrument of ratification of or accession to the present
Convention, declare, by a notification addressed to the Government of the Netherlands, that it will apply the
Uniform Law only to contracts in which the parties thereto have, by virtue of article 4 of the Uniform Law,
chosen that Law as the law of the contract.
ULIS, supra note 16, art. V. This option was exercised by Great Britain when it adopted ULIS. Uniform Laws on
International Sales Act, 1967, ch. 45, § 1(3).
28. Professor Honnold states that sales under the Convention must be international. J. HONNOLD, supra note 2, § 13,
at 57. See also Rdczei, The Area of Operation of the International Sales Conventions, 29 AM. J. Comp. L. 513, 517-22
(1981).
29. Report of the Working Group on the International Sale of Goods on the Work of Its First Session to the Third
Session of the United Nations Commission on International Trade Law, 30-44, Jan. 5-16, 1970, U.N. Doe. A/CN.9/
35, reprinted in [1968-701 1 Y.B. INT'L TRADE L. COMM'N 176, 180-81, U.N. Doe. AICN.9SER.A1970; Report of
the Working Group on the International Sale of Goods on the Work of Its Second Session to the Fourth Session of the
United Nations Commission on International Trade Law, 11-31, Dec. 7-18, 1970, U.N. Doe. A/CN.9152, reprinted
in [1971] 2 Y.B. INT'L TRADE L. COMM'N 50, 51-54, U.N. Doe. AICN.91SER.A1I971.
30. Article 1 of ULIS provides in pertinent part:
1. The present Law shall apply to contracts of sale of goods entered into by parties whose places of
business are in the territories of different States, in each of the following cases:
a) where the contract involves the sale of goods which are at the time of the conclusion of the contract in the
course of carriage or will be carried from the territory of one State to the territory of another;
b) where the acts constituting the offer and the acceptance have been effected in the territories of different
States;
c) where delivery of the goods is to be made in the territory of a State other than that within whose territory the
acts constituting the offer and the acceptance have been effected.
2. Where a party to the contract does not have a place of business, reference shall be made to his habitual
residence.
3. The application of the present Law shall not depend on the nationality of the parties.
ULIS, supra note 16, art. 1.
31. Id.
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parties must be from different countries. Two Americans buying and selling goods
located overseas are not engaging in an international transaction under this definition,
nor are two Americans buying and selling goods that the buyer ultimately intends to
ship overseas. Second, something about the transaction must be transnational. Either
the goods must physically move across a border, or the dealings between the parties
must be across a border. A Frenchman buying machines at a showroom in Los
Angeles for delivery at the factory is not engaging in an international transaction,
although the purchase of the same machines by telex communications from his home
office in Paris may be.
The factors are cumulative, and the conclusion that the sale is international
becomes more persuasive as the number of factors present increases. The actual
movement of the goods in the course of the transaction seems the most persuasive
indication of international character, but the presence of no one factor alone is likely
to satisfy the definitional requirements. The international quality of the transaction
thus often eludes easy definitional capture.
The definitional uncertainty in the Convention arises from the lack of in-
strumental reference in the definition itself. What an international transaction is
depends on why one wants to know. If the concern is with the transport of goods on
the high seas or the payment of obligations across borders separating different mone-
tary systems, then international transactions are easily defined. Likewise, if the
definition's context is a system of economic planning which sharply distinguishes
between domestic and foreign trade, perhaps by assigning responsibility for planning
and conducting particular transactions to one governmental ministry while those in
another category are the responsibility of a completely different set of officials, a
transaction that is international is easily distinguished from one that is not on the basis
of which officials are conducting it.
The converse should be equally clear. If one does not have a functional aim in
view, it is difficult to recognize international transactions other than those that
possess so many indicia of an international character that the question is obviated.
The source of the Convention drafters' problem is that, because international trade is
increasingly integrated, it is not an economically or functionally distinct category of
trade engaged in by a distinct group of people. The drafters therefore lacked a clear
rationale for treating a particular set of transactions distinctly from all others. They
knew they wanted the Convention to cover broadly all sales transactions that might be
deemed international, but they were not politically prepared to convert their project
into an effort at true world law harmonization of all sales transactions.
The problematic quality of the definitional provisions of ULIS were promptly
addressed by the Working Group on the International Sale of Goods when work on
the new Convention began. 32 In particular, the Working Group was unhappy with the
32. UNCITRAL depends on Working Groups for drafting and technical studies. This process is described in
Honnold, The United Nations Commission on International Trade Law: Mission and Methods, 27 AM. J. CoMP. L. 201,
208-09 (1979). See Report of the United Nations Commission on International Trade Law on the Work of Its Fourth
Session to the General Assembly, 26 U.N. GAOR Supp. (No. 17), U.N. Doc. A/8417 (1971), reprinted in [1971 12 Y.B.
ret, TRADE: L. COMm'N 9, 18, U.N. Doe. AICN.9lSER.A1971 (recounting the history and duties of the Working
Group on the International Sale of Goods).
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idea of making carriage of the goods across national borders a condition of the
Convention's applicability. Clearly, if parties enter into a contract that calls upon the
seller to ship and deliver goods to the buyer's nation before payment is due, the
contract is international. However, such transactions are not very common. More
frequently, the parties will make a C.I.F. contract 3 3 that contemplates the packing,
shipment, and insurance of goods from one country to another. This is an in-
ternational contract, even though the definition of a C.I.F. contract provides that title
passes and risk of loss shifts from the seller to the buyer before the goods leave the
seller's country. A contract that provides delivery F.A.S. a ship in the harbor would
also seem quite unambiguously international in character even though the transaction
is complete before the goods leave port. 34 It is less self-evident that a contract
contemplating delivery of goods at the seller's place of business is an international
contract, even if the seller agrees to pack the goods in ways appropriate for in-
ternational carriage or to provide documentation, such as consular invoices or certifi-
cates of origin, which indicate that the goods will be sent to another country.
The Working Group, wishing to include all these types of transactions within the
definition, sought to produce that result by providing that it would be enough if
carriage of the goods were contemplated at the time of the contract. 35 However,
translating the nuances of the French text into English revealed the weaknesses in this
proposal.36 The text left uncertain whether it would be enough that the goods were in
fact later carried, without regard to what the parties contemplated at the time the
contract was formed. This proposal also presented the anomolous possibility that an
unanticipated shipment of goods sold domestically might bring the Convention into
play after formation of the contract; thereby retrospectively invoking a different set of
rules. The term "contemplated" also implied the element of scienter, raising the
question of what the parties would have to know at the time of contract formation
before they would be deemed to have contemplated international movement of the
goods. As this Article demonstrates, this recurrent question of the parties' knowledge
casts doubt on other solutions to the jurisdictional problem.
At its core, the notion of an international transaction is clear and specific. But
like so many legal concepts, it blurs at the edges. Unless the creator of the concept
has some definite functional purpose in mind, the outcome in these indeterminate
situations will depend on the characterization of the parties' uncertain mental state,
that is, what they contemplated. When a jurisdictional legal standard turns on the
33. The C.I.F. contract, in which the seller's price includes cost, insurance, and freight, is defined in U.C.C.
§ 2-320 (1978) and INTERNATIONAL CHAMBER OF COMMERCE, PuB. No. 350, INCOTERtS (1980). See generally D.
SAssOON, C.I.F. AND F.O.B. CoNTAcTs (2d ed. 1975) (extensive statement of the law relating to C.I.F. and F.O.B.
contracts and the practice applicable thereto).
34. U.C.C. § 2-319(2) (1978); INTERNATIONAL CHAMBER OF COMMERCE, PuB. No. 350, INcOTERMS (1980).
35. Report of the Working Group on the International Sale of Goods on the Work of Its First Session to the Third
Session of the United Nations Commission on International Trade Law, U.N. Doe. A/CN.9/3S, 40 (1970). reprinted in
11968-70] 1 Y.B. INT'L TRADE L. CoMM'N 176, 180, U.N. Doe. A/CN.9ISER.A/1970; Report of the United Nations
Commission on International Trade Law on the Work of Its Third Session to the General Assembly, 50-51, 25
U.N. GAOR Supp. (No. 17), U.N. Doc. A18017 (1970), reprinted in 11968-7011 Y.B. INT'L TRADE L. COMM'N 129,
135-36, U.N. Doe. AICN.9/SER.Alt970.
36. See infra note 128.
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determination of the contemplation of the parties, the capacity for predicting out-
comes is likely to be very limited.
One obvious solution would have been to limit the scope of the Convention to
transactions whose core is truly international, that is, those in which carriage is either
part of the contract or expressly mentioned by provisions that call for delivery to a
ship or export documentation. The problems could also have been avoided by requir-
ing that the parties trigger application of the Convention by express agreement.
37
Instead, the Working Group, frustrated in its efforts to define an international transac-
tion, spread the jurisdictional net wider and provided that application of the Conven-
tion shall depend on only one factor, the parties having places of business in different
countries.
B. Parties with Places of Business in Different Countries
At first glance the transnational character of the parties' businesses appears to
provide a convenient way of determining whether a contract is international. It avoids
drawing distinctions between C.I.F., F.O.B., and F.A.S. contracts, between parties
who contemplated shipment as part of the contract and those who did not, and
between goods that in fact move across borders at some time and those that do not. It
also avoids difficult issues of nationality by focusing on the physical location of the
parties' activities, rather than their citizenship or legal status. As long as the parties
deal with each other from their home base and without intermediaries, the standard
seems easy to apply. Each side will inevitably be aware that it is dealing with a
foreigner.
The problem is that the two conditions just mentioned often do not apply in
modem commerce. Businesspersons, and their employees and agents, are highly
mobile. International commerce is aided by opportunities for face-to-face dealings. In
addition, over the centuries a great variety of forms of intermediaries have developed
to connect buyers and sellers in different countries. Some of these intermediaries deal
on their own account, while others are employees or commission agents acting on
behalf of their principal. In French and German law the picture is much more com-
plex, for the codes provide a bewildering number of variations on this theme, each
relationship having distinct legal consequences. 38 Discussion of subjects like the
complexity of the law of undisclosed principals 39 and the special English rules
regarding foreign principals 40 is beyond the scope of this Article, but suffice it to say
that the area is full of complexities which the Convention does not directly address.
Presumably, a foreign buyer in retaining a local purchasing agent that discloses
its status will be within the Convention, but the agent may deem it prudent for
37. See supra note 27 for a comparable provision in ULIS.
38. See. e.g., Burkard, Termination Compensation to Distributors Under German Law, 7 INT'L LAW. 185 (1973);
Lando, The Commercial Agent in European Law, 1965 J. Bus. L. 179, 374 (continued in 1966 J. Bus. L. 82);
Schmitthoff, Agency in International Trade: A Study in Comparative Law, in I RECUEIL DES COURS (Collected Courses of
the Hague Academy of International Law) 106, 129 (1970).
39. RE TAmeN'T (SECoND) oF AoF'tcy §§ 186-211 (1957); Hill, Some Problems of the Undisclosed Principal,
1967 J. Bus. L. 122.
40. Teheran-Europe Co. v. S.T. Belton Ltd., [1968] 2 Q.B. 545.
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business reasons not to disclose the identity of the principal, or even that it is acting as
an agent. For most legal purposes, the existence of an undisclosed principal causes no
significant problems. According to article 1(2) of the Convention, the fact that the
parties have their place of business in different nations is to be disregarded whenever
"this fact does not appear either from the contract or from any dealings between, or
from information disclosed by, the parties at any time before or at the conclusion of
the contract."41 This carefully crafted definition suggests by its very complexity the
difficulties posed by the need to determine what "facts" or "information" are relevant
in a given situation. A seller or a buyer may know that the person with whom it is
dealing often represents foreign principals and that the person is listed in relevant
trade directories and the yellow pages under the heading "export agents." The seller
may be aware that the specifications for the product suggest that it is to be used
abroad. The packing requirements may indicate that travel is expected. The problem
with article 1(2) is that it creates the kind of legal complexities that legal advisors to
business would rather avoid.
When the parties deal with each other face-to-face, the problems of knowledge
multiply. A woman whose dress and demeanor are foreign comes into a showroom.
Speaking in heavily accented English, she buys goods for delivery at the factory with
payment through a local bank. The question arises whether the seller is put on notice
from "information disclosed by the parties" that this is an international transaction. It
is not clear that these factors suggest where her place of business or that of her
employer is.
The language of article 1(2) appears to contemplate an objective standard of
knowledge, dependent on facts that "appear from the contract" or matters "disclosed
by the parties." But article 8 of the Convention contradicts this standard.42 Article
8(1) provides that a party's statements and conduct are to be interpreted for purposes
of the Convention according to "his intent where the other party knew or could not
have been unaware what that intent was." According to article 8(2), when the crystal
clear provisions of 8(1) do not apply, the statements and conduct of the parties are to
be interpreted in accordance with "the understanding that a reasonable person of the
same kind as the other party would have had in the same circumstances."
In sum, if the parties deal with each other from a distance, the jurisdiction of the
Convention is relatively clear. If they deal with each other face-to-face or through an
agent, however, sensitive questions of jurisdiction will turn on the trier of fact's
41. Convention, supra note 1, art. 1(3).
42. Article 8 provides:
(1) For the purposes of this Convention statements made by and other conduct of a party are to be
interpreted according to his intent where the other party knew or could not have been unaware what that intent
was.
(2) If the preceding paragraph is not applicable, statements made by and other conduct of a party are to be
interpreted according to the understanding that a reasonable person of the same kind as the other party would
have had in the same circumstances.
(3) In determing the intent of a party or the understanding a reasonable person would have had, due
consideration is to be given to all relevant circumstances of the case including the negotiations, any practices
which the parties have established between themselves, usages and any subsequent conduct of the parties.
Id., art. 8.
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assessment, according to either an objective or a subjective standard, of essentially
indeterminate circumstances. In this way the law of the world has been unified.
C. What is a Place of Business?
The concept of place of business itself is uncertain. It does not describe a
juridical status, as citizenship or place of incorporation might. It requires something
more than temporary presence; it is not parallel to the familiar concept of "doing
business" used in this country to determine whether a corporation is amenable to suit
in a particular jurisdiction.4 3 Professor John Honnold, in his commentary to the
Convention, seems quite sure that it describes a permanent and not a temporary place
of business.' Neither having a hotel room or a rented office in a city nor engaging in
sales transactions on repeated occasions in the nation appear to suffice. After review-
ing the variety of factors that must be considered to resolve the problem posed by a
party with places of business in two states, Professor Honnold concludes, "However,
when the balance seems close the parties would be well advised to settle the point by
contract-by stating whether the Convention or specified domestic law is
applicable." 45 The weakness of the place of business standard is the likelihood that its
application will be determined by circumstances that are remote from the in-
formational context in which businesspersons are likely to be at the time of negotia-
tion.
The Working Group Report to the Fourth Session of UNCITRAL indicates that
those drafting the jurisdictional provisions of the Convention thought that the exclu-
sion of consumer sales in article 2(a) would take care of the problems of contracts
made and goods delivered in one country.46 They proposed a definition of consumer
sales that seems workable, although probably not broad enough to have the intended
effect. 4 7 In any event, this definition was not included in the final Convention.
Instead, the exclusion of consumer sales embodies another "knew or ought to have
known" standard.48
43. Shaffer v. Heimer, 433 U.S. 186 (1977); International Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310 (1945).
44. During the preparation of the Convention, some delegates were concerned lest "place of business" be
construed to extend to a hotel room or other temporary place where a traveling agent might conduct negotia-
tions. Referring to a "permanent" place of business presented drafting difficulties, and most delegates concluded
that temporary sojourns would not establish a "place of business."
J. HONNOLD, supra note 2, § 124 (footnote omitted). See also id. § 43 (demonstrating the problem of a temporary place of
sojourn during negotiations through an example).
45. Id. § 42, at 80.
46. Report of the Vorking Group on the International Sale of Goods on the Work of Its Second Session to the Fourth
Session of the United Nations Commission on International Trade Law, U.N. Doe. AICN.9/52, 26 (1970), reprinted in
11971] 2 Y.B. INT'L TRADE L. COMM'N 50, 53, U.N. Doe. AICN.9/SER.A1971.
47. Id. S 51, at 55-56.
48. Article 2(a) of the Convention actually provides an even less satisfactory standard than is suggested in the text
since the definition of a consumer sale under this article includes "goods bought for personal, family or household use,
unless the seller, at any time before or at the conclusion of the contract, neither knew nor ought to have known that the
goods were bought for any such use." This provision will create problems for a party trying to prove a negative regarding
another party's state of mind, or what that party's state of mind ought to have been, from some indeterminate point in time
to the moment of the conclusion of the contract. Convention, supra note I, art. 2(a).
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D. Other Jurisdictional Problems
The first ten articles of the Convention, which define its scope, contain a number
of other problematic provisions. Although full exploration of these provisions is not
possible in this Article, mention of a few of them will suggest the extent of the
jurisdictional difficulties. For instance, the Convention applies to the "sale of goods."
Yet despite their jurisdictional nature, neither sales nor goods are defined. 49 Article 3
explicitly includes contracts for goods to be manufactured unless the goods are
incidental to supplying labor and services. The Convention provides no guidance
concerning mixed goods, unfinished goods, unsevered minerals, or crops. It is sur-
prising in a modem commercial setting that the drafters did not indicate whether sales
include consignments, leases, barter transactions, franchises, or transactions in which
title is retained for purposes of security.
Article 5 provides that the Convention does not apply to liability of the seller for
death or personal injury caused by the goods to any person. The drafters thus avoided
the need to produce a unified law covering the tangle of product liability issues which
most legal systems have not satisfactorily resolved. But in severing personal injury
claims the Convention might have indicated what is to happen when such claims arise
in conjunction with property losses. Property loss and personal injuries are likely to
arise from the same incident. It is not clear whether one set of rules regarding
formation and performance govern the property claims and another the personal
injury.
According to article 4, the Convention "is not concerned with ... the validity
of the contract or any of its provisions." 50 Validity is a term of art, which in European
usage means that the Convention does not displace national law on so-called manda-
tory clauses. This protean body of law includes much of what American law classifies
under the rubric of the doctrines of mistake, duress, unconscionability, fraud, and
illegality.5 1 The problem again is that these terms are not self-defining, and there
appears to be substantial disagreement whether specific common problems are within
their scope. For example, at least one expert opines that disclaimers of damages are
permissible in contracts under the Convention, although others would hold that these
questions are questions of validity under article 4 and are therefore governed by
residual national law. 52
If the parties wish to avoid the jurisdiction of the Convention, article 6 permits
them to "exclude [its] application" or "derogate from or vary the effect of any of its
provisions. ' '5' This provision preserves the autonomy of the parties and enables
sophisticated contractors to avoid its problems by an express exclusion. The Conven-
49. Compare U.C.C. §§ 2-102, -105, -106, and -107 (1978) (defining the scope and the terms of Article 2 on
sales).
50. Convention, supra note 1, art. 4.
51. J. HONNOLD, supra note 2, §§ 64-70; Philip, Mandatory Rules, Public Law (Political Rules) and Choice ofLawv
in the E.E.C. Convention on the Law Applicable to Contractual Obligations, in CoNTRAcr CONFLICrs 81 (ed. P. North
1982). See infra text accompanying notes 103-09.
52. Edrsi, supra note 21, at 348-49.
53. Convention, supra note 1, art. 6.
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tion is less clear on the extent to which the parties can exclude application of the
Convention by implication. The most common instance of implicit exclusion would
be the familiar choice of law clause now found in many international commercial
agreements. Whether the parties' statement in the agreement that their contract is to
be governed by the law of New York impliedly excludes the Convention would
appear to be a question of interpretation on which article 8(1) directs an investigation
of the parties' subjective intent, while article 8(2) specifies an objective view. To
some extent this question raises renvoi issues: the reference to the law of New York
may be to the domestic law of New York or to the total law of New York, which will,
after ratification, include the Convention under the supremacy clause.5 4 Although the
drafters of article 6 could hardly have been unaware of these problems or of the
commercial practices regarding choice of law clauses, they chose to provide little
guidance. 5
5
E. Procedural Dimensions of the Problem
The Convention is quite insensitive to the procedural implications of the rules it
announces. Undoubtedly, the drafters hoped that the parties would have recourse to
commercial arbitration, in which these questions tend to be blended in the arbitrator's
discretion and terms of reference. When litigation does occur, however, there will be
great opportunities for dilatory motions in common-law courts, and in some court
systems the jurisdictional quality of the issues will create opportunities for undesir-
able interlocutory appeals.
The Convention generally does not address procedural matters and therefore
does not indicate where the burden of persuasion lies. This is an issue of great
importance when the standards have uncertain empirical referents-what parties
knew or should have known--or require the proof of a negative-what a party could
not have been unaware of. Presumably, burdens of persuasion and proof are reserved
for national law under article 4, but in that case the unification, in terms of the
increased predictability of results produced by the Convention, is marginal. Rules of
burden of persuasion or rules of decision for hard cases are likely to control the
outcome of most cases worth litigating. The drafters could have been more sensitive
to the impact on legal certainty and predictability of rules that places unsustainable
burdens of persuasion on one party.
III. THE UNEASY COMPROMISES OF THE CONVENTION
After years of inconclusive discussion, the fact that the delegates arrived at a text
that displaces familiar national systems can only be explained as a compromise. A
compromise is hardly a flaw in any human enterprise that seeks to bring under its
umbrella the views of virtually all the tribes of humanity. In view of the ever
54. U.S. CoNsT. art. VI, § 2.
55. Dore & Defranco, A Comparison of the Non-Substantive Provisions of the UNCITRAL Convention on the
International Sale of Goods and the Uniform Commercial Code, 23 HARV. INT'L L.J. 49, 51, 53-54 (1982). Professor
Peter Winship discusses this problem in more detail in a paper entitled "The Scope of the Vienna Convention on
International Sales Contracts," which he delivered at the 1983 Parker School Conference, supra note 6.
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widening group of participants in the negotiations, agreement would have been im-
possible. Yet the Convention as drafted does manage to resolve real issues, and many
of the solutions undoubtedly do not reflect the individual preferences of the delegates.
The difficulty with many of these apparent compromises is that they simply do
not resolve the problem they purport to address. They do not reflect two parties
having yielded part of their positions to each other for the sake of agreement, but
rather two sides agreeing to give the appearance of agreement by a verbal formula
which does not provide meaningful guidance in concrete situations.
There are gaps and shortcomings in the outcome of every effort at legislative
codification. The final judgment on the acceptability of any legislation involves
weighing its genuine accomplishments against its failures. In the context of the
Convention, however, the false appearance of agreement is especially serious be-
cause of the rigid position the Convention takes toward further legal growth. With the
potential for clarification and growth blocked, these false compromises undermine
substantive unification of law and submerge the conflict enough to hinder easy
correction.
A. The Strategy of Unification
The inadequacies of the Convention as drafted do not reflect adversely on the
competence or diligence of the negotiators. On the contrary, the team included
luminaries from many countries, and the American delegation, headed by the Repor-
ter of the Restatement (Second) of Contracts, was guided for decades by the first rank
of scholars in the field.5 6 The uneasy compromises of the Convention are of primary
importance as symptoms of the inherent weakness in the methodology and strategy of
law unification pursued by the drafters. Inevitably, the basic weaknesses of the
Convention resulted from the impossibility of achieving by consensus what the dele-
gates sought: a unified statement of contract rules satisfactory to the whole world.
Over the half century of the project commercial and legal practices changed radically,
and the goals originally set for the project were subtly transformed in ways that
precluded their achievement.
It is only a slight exaggeration to suggest that the original efforts of this project
were designed to bring the approaches of the French, German, and Italian codes into
conformity, with the hope that perhaps those strange Englishmen across the Channel
would cooperate and give up their idiosyncratic legal habits. In the context of the
1920s and 30s, agreement among those European neighbors would have been hard to
reach, but should have been possible in light of the congruity of their economic,
cultural, and political situations. The task became more complex after the Second
World War, when an enlarged Europe, including several socialist countries, a few
former colonies, and the Americans joined the effort. 57 The Americans were on the
56. American participants have included Professors John Honnold; Willis Reese, Reporter of the Restatement
(Second) of the Conflict of Laws; Allan Farnsworth, Reporter of the Restatement (Second) of Contracts; and Hans Smit,
Director of the Parker School of Foreign and Comparative Law.
57. The United States was not formally represented at the Hague Conference of Private International Law until 1956
when official observers were sent by the State Department. Membership in the Hague Conference and the International
Institute for the Unification of Private Law was authorized by statute in 1963.22 U.S.C. § 269(g) (1982). The history has
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brink of what was to prove a highly successful harmonization effort in this area of
law. Moreover,, their half century of experience with harmonization through the
restatements, model acts, and uniform codes had persuaded the American delegates
that the structure and strategy being followed were probably too rigid to achieve a
satisfactory result. Although these difficulties were recognized by the American
delegation when it first appeared in The Hague in the 1950s, in the end it cooperated
with the others. 58 In any event, by the time that UNCITRAL assumed the dominant
role in the project during the late 1960s, any vestige of the clubbish atmosphere of its
origins in The Hague and Rome were long gone. No longer were the meetings merely
among European neighbors, nor the points in contention simple differences in empha-
sis that had separated the various nineteenth-century codifications of French- and
German-speaking, industrial, capitalistic, essentially liberal regimes. Now the sixty-
two delegations included nations that were industrial and underdeveloped, capitalist
and socialist, those generally accepting the rules that had governed international trade
for a long time and those who perceived themselves as the oppressed victims of that
legal regime. In such a setting, unification through compromise is a very different
thing from what had been envisioned by the original participants in the project.
The strategy of the Convention from an early stage had been to harmonize the
world's contract law systems insofar as they apply to international transactions, by
providing a single conceptual statement of the rules that govern the enforceability of
such transactions. If everyone could agree on a single, reasonable set of rules, that is,
one that strongly resembled the one with which the speaker is most familiar, then the
babel of divergent national legal systems would break down, and a coherent and
predictable framework for these business transactions would emerge. This strategy
has much to recommend it since many legal rules, and particularly contract rules, are
largely conventional. In fact, world commerce is effectively segmented on inefficient
lines that lead to cartelization because of the inability to agree on conventional rules
regarding specifications of electric plugs, nuts and bolts, and the like. The Hague
Rules on Bills of Lading, 59 the Banker's Customs on Documentary Credits,60 the
International Chamber of Commerce trade definitions embodied in Incoterms, 6 1 and
other successful attempts at the coordination of trade law suggest that this con-
ventional approach has the potential to succeed in many areas. It allows parties to
allocate risks in ways that are quite certain. As long as the businesspersons involved
recognize the risks, they can provide for them through insurance and the price
mechanism.
This conventional approach to rule unification has, however, created difficulties
been traced by Professor Nadelmann. See Nadelinann, Hague Conference, supra note 10, and Nadelmann, Ignored State
Interests, supra note 10. During the period of observer status the American representatives were active participants. See
Nadelmann & Reese, The American Proposal at the Hague Conference on Private International Law to Use the Method of
Uniform Laws, 7 AM. J. Comtp. L. 239 (1958).
58. Nadelmann & Reese, supra note 57.
59. International Convention for the Unification of Certain Rules Relating to Bills of Lading, Aug. 25, 1924, 51
Stat. 233, T.S. No. 931, 120 L.N.T.S. 155, reprinted in 2 U.N. COMM'N ON INT'L TRADE LAW, REGISTER OF TEX-IS OF
CONVENTIONS AND OTHER INSTRUMEN'IS CONCERNING INTERNATIONAL TRADE LAW 130 (1973).
60. INTERNATIONAL CHAMBER OF COMMERCE, PuB. No. 290, UNIFORM CUSTOMS AND PRACTICE FOR DOCUMEN-
TARY CREDrs (1974).
61. INTERNATIONAL CHAMBER OF COMMERCE, Pun. No. 350, INCoTERMS (1980).
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on several levels. First, some rules come in sets, and problems result when part of the
set is treated as merely conventional without necessary adjustments in the rest of the
set. Since the rules of contract formation, for example, are highly conventional, it
might appear inconsequential whether acceptances communicated over a distance are
effective when mailed or when received, as long as the rule is clear. Similarly,
business behavior can be adjusted to rules regarding the revocation of offers if those
rules are clear enough so that both parties to a transaction know whether they have the
power of acceptance or the liability of being bound to an offer. The Anglo-American
and Continental systems traditionally have taken very different approaches to these
issues, and both conventions seem to work satisfactorily.
62
These rules are, however, not quite conventional. They are joined by common
attitudes that in the Anglo-American experience emphasize the role of bargain in
describing the legally enforceable promise. Emphasis on the notion that contracts are
bargains, as embodied in the American legal doctrine of consideration and its se-
quels, tends to view the formation process as the moment in time when the contract is
perfected by the delivery of the bargained for equivalent of the promise. That is,
acceptance occurs when the promisee provides consideration. The familiar common-
law mailbox rules and treatment of the revocability of promises exemplify this atti-
tude. Continental European systems long ago took another path. No great harm is
done by the Convention's modifications of the mailbox rules or those governing
revocability of offers if the sequels are taken care of elsewhere in the Convention.6 3
Unfortunately, they do not appear to be. The doctrine of consideration and its se-
quels, for instance, are left outside the unification project by operation of the ex-
clusions in article 4.64
62. 1 FORMATION OF CoNTRAcrs 747-91 (ed. R. Schlesinger 1968); A. VoN MEHREN & J. GORDL.Y, Tilm CIVIL
LAW SYsTEM 873-82 (2d ed. 1977).
63. Professor Melvin Eisenberg provides a brilliant illustration of the interrelationships among doctrines in his
analysis of gift promises under civil-law and common-law consideration doctrine. He cogently suggests that what appear
to be curious divergences in analysis between the two legal systems' treatment of gifts, may in fact reflect basic
differences in legal style and court procedures.
As these rules suggest, our legal system could not appropriately follow the lead of the civil law by making
donative promises enforceable on the basis of their forni--as through recognition of nominal consideration-
unless we were also prepared to follow the civil law by developing and administering a body of rules dealing
with the problems of improvidence and ingratitude. Certainly such an enterprise is possible. It may be ques-
tioned, however, whether the game would be worth the candle. An inquiry into improvidence involves the
measurement of wealth, lifestyle, dependents' needs, and even personal utilities. An inquiry into ingratitude
involves the measurement of a maelstrom, since many or most donative promises arise in an intimate context in
which emotions, motives, and cues are invariably complex and highly interrelated. Perhaps the civil-law style of
adjudication is suited to wrestling with these kinds of inquiries, but they have held little appeal for common-law
courts, which have traditionally been oriented toward inquiry into acts rather than into personal characteristics.
Eisenberg, Donative Promises, 47 U. CI. L. REV. 1, 15-16 (1979) (footnotes omitted).
64. A number of years ago, the late Professor Addison Mueller offered a seminar at the UCLA Law School with the
late Professor Folke Schmidt, of the law faculty of the University of Uppsala, that demonstrated the compensatory and
complementary interrelatedness of apparently conventional rules. Each professor selected five factual situations which he
believed his nation's law of sales (the UCC and the Scandinavian Sales of Goods Act) did not resolve satisfactorily.
During each session of the seminar the first hour was occupied with an exposition of the situation and during the second
hour the coparticipant from the other legal system described how the problem would be analyzed and resolved. Starting
from a common factual statement, the two participants often went off in opposite directions, but while one would take an
analytic sharp left turn, the other would turn right at the next intersection, producing parallel analytic paths. In most of the
ten problems the last phase of the analysis also included a third opposite turn that led to almost the same resting point.
Relatively harmonious results were produced by consistent divergence in rules. Yet if all these rules had been treated as
merely conventional, as they certainly appeared to be at the outset of the discussion, one might well have been tempted to
harmonize American and Scandinavian law by giving each side fifty percent of the conventional rules. The unanticipated
result probably would be that at the end of the analysis the two systems would no longer converge.
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Moreover, not all rules are merely conventional. Some do reflect deeply held
cultural and ideological attitudes, although probably not as many rules have these
profound bases as some commentators suggest. For example, the question of the
proper treatment of custom and usage in contract interpretation sharply divided the
UNCITRAL delegates for a decade.65 This debate involved many factors, but a
crucial one was ideology. Some legal regimes are quite content with the past and look
to tradition as a fountain of accumulated wisdom. For most Americans, community
practice as embodied in common law is a source of just expectations about the future
behavior of others. In contrast, those regimes that perceive their society as shackled
by the remnants of an unjust past which must be smashed by a revolutionary process
of renovation are not likely to be sympathetic to perpetuating past behavior by
enshrining it as binding rules. Nor are the representatives of centrally planned,
authoritarian economies likely to place great value on private autonomy, the right of
parties to opt out of legal regimes by contract, or opportunities for informal, unwrit-
ten contracts. Attitudes toward performance and rules governing breach also will
differ significantly depending on whether one comes from an industrialized society
with balanced numbers of buyers and sellers of finished goods or from a have-not
economy which must buy most manufactured and complex goods from outsiders who
are believed to be selling shoddy goods, whose flaws become apparent only long after
delivery, to unsophisticated buyers.
66
A final flaw in the approach to unification that aims at reconciliation of con-
ventional rules is that it places too much emphasis on the formal statement of the rules
as the determinant of dispute resolution. It is assumed that if the rules are unified the
outcome of disputes will be harmonized. This expectation is unjustified to the extent
that it is not the rules, but the interpretation of agreements and factual situations, the
decisionmaker's attitudes toward agreement behavior, and the understanding of the
expectations created by a particular agreement that will determine the ultimate out-
come of most contested situations.
67
If rules are seen as conventional, all coherent compromises are real. Negotiators
can trade one point for another and balance their advantage. To the extent that
contract rules are not simply conventional, however, the process of compromise
requires some substantive basis for accommodation. To gain agreement, one side has
the all but impossible task of persuading the other of the superiority of the cultural
and ideological underpinnings of the rule. In a few cases, there might be instrumental
advantages to one approach over the other, but the Convention tries to unify a number
of functioning systems which have been molded and polished by long experience.
Like the rest of the legal world, the negotiators had no ready access to empirical
evidence on the practical results of these rules, nor is there a body of experimental
knowledge that would support the assertion that, operationally, one approach is
superior to the other. Yet, the drafters of the Convention were committed to an
approach that provided no clear way to resolve persistent disagreements on the rules.
65. J. HoN 'LDO, supra note 2, §§ 112-122; E6rsi, supra note 21, at 341.
66. Date-Bah, The United Nations Convention on Contracts for the International Sale of Goods, 1980: Overview
and Selective Commentary. 11 Rev. GHANA L. 50 (1979); E6rsi, supra note 21, at 349-50.
67. No one has yet improved on Judge Jerome Frank's dictum: "Perhaps nine-tenths of legal uncertainty is caused by
uncertainty as to what courts will find, on conflicting evidence, to be the facts of cases." Zell v. American Seating Co.,
138 F.2d 641, 648 (2d. Cir. 1943).
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If it is unlikely that either side will persuade the other of the superiority of its
approach, agreement might be reached by finding solutions to old problems that are
free of the conceptual baggage of any existing approach. This sort of imaginative
resolution of old problems is the crowning achievement of article 2 of the UCC. The
UCC's treatment of offers and acceptances that do not match,68 of cure and assurance
during performance, 69 and of liability issues that previously turned on title to the
goods70 indicates that law harmonization can be the occasion for liberating reform.
Even critics of these reforms are likely to admire their capacity to free analysis from
the morass in which old conceptual formulations had mired legal thought.
From the common-law perspective it is not clear in what situations the Conven-
tion's solutions are novel for other legal systems. The overriding impression, how-
ever, is that the number of substantive improvements in American law is small. The
Convention adopts the continuum along which familiar doctrinal formulations are
found as a given and looks for an acceptable unified provision somewhere along that
axis, for the drafters did not resolve conflicting views by taking new conceptual
approaches.
The net result was that only one course lay open for achieving verbal com-
promises of conflicting positions. The aim of the Working Groups over the years was
to find the right combination of words that would not be too offensive to any partici-
pant in the negotiations. 7' They sought to soften opposing perspectives, to grant
small concessions to salve the feelings of the side that lost the last argument, and to
straddle two points of view. Inevitably, they often sought refuge from specific dis-
agreements through a formulation on a higher level of abstraction, by encompassing
both alternatives and not choosing between them. This is an acceptable and perhaps a
politically necessary course. Unfortunately, it provides no reliable framework for
interpretation. The product conveys little to those who must counsel or predict prob-
able outcomes of litigation. Instead of unifying the law, it undermines the organic
coherence of a legal system. Elastic words are undesirable in international enactments
even more than in national enactments because the international situation does not
possess the coherent background for interpretation.
1. Compromises Reached by Moving in Two Directions at the Same Time:
The Puzzles of Article 8 on Interpretation
Any useful unification of world contract law will have to proceed from compat-
ible views of what a contract is and what sorts of evidence give reliable guidance on
the content of an agreement. The reason is eminently practical; most contract disputes
turn on questions of interpretation. When the contract is in writing, it is very likely
that someone will suggest that the document imperfectly or incompletely expresses
68. U.C.C. § 2-207 (1978).
69. Id. §§ 2-518 and 2-609.
70. Id. §§ 2-401 and 2-509.
71. Professor E6rsi describes with good humor four different types of compromises: those that are clear and
recognizable; those that are detectable only by initiates with access to Conference documents; those entered with mental
reservations on each side, each side keeping its own view of what was agreed; and those, masking continuing disagree-
ment, that are illusory and save face. E6rsi, supra note 21, at 346.
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what the parties meant. The meaning of the contract depends either on the words and
symbols of the document, or what the parties intended to say, but imperfectly ex-
pressed. Moreover, every contract is formulated against the backdrop of social ex-
pectations, practices, and experience that are essential to its fulfilment. No written
contract is ever complete; even the most carefully drafted document rests on volumes
of assumptions that cannot be explicitly expressed. The more basic the assumption,
the less likely it is that either party will be conscious of it or will think it necessary to
express it.
Attitudes toward the process of interpretation vary markedly among legal com-
munities and are not static even within a single legal system. For example, the rules
regarding the use of evidence of prior oral communications between the parties to
supplement the written terms of an agreement have undergone substantial revision in
this country over a quite short period of time. 72 These differences stem not merely
from old habits in formulating abstractions; they reflect differences in the procedures
used for resolving disputes in court and the differing roles assigned judges. Systems
in which the trial is governed by a group of judges drawn from a professional, career
judiciary, appointed by written examination and answerable to a governmental minis-
try, will have different expectations than systems that are dominated by lawyers and
that continue to rely on lay jurors or autonomous, but arbitral judges popularly
elected to office. 73 Differences in expectations also reflect the differing capacity of a
powerful third party, such as a state planning agency in a socialist system or a flinty
banker in a capitalistic system, to insist that the rules of contract give priority to its
security, by allowing it to rely on what the document appears to mean, over the actual
intention of the parties who negotiated the contract. These matters also are heavily
influenced by ideology. Some commentators insist that interpretation must give pre-
ponderant weight to the expressed will of the individuals who created the contract as
an exercise of their will.
Article 8 of the Convention seeks to bring uniformity to the conflicting
approaches to interpretation of the parties' communications by melding inconsistent
approaches in one article. The twain meet verbally, but the result is not easy to
understand and is likely to prove impossible to apply. Article 8(1) declares that a
party's statements and conduct are "to be interpreted according to his intent where the
other party knew or could not have been unaware what that intent was." This state-
ment points in the direction of what Americans call the subjective theory of contract;
agreement is the meeting of minds, and the meaning of the contract is what the parties
subjectively believe it to be, as revealed by the symbols they exchange, rather than
the meaning that others would attach to those symbols. Article 8(2) provides that if
the provision just described does not apply, statements and conduct are to be in-
72. The certitude of Williston's treatise and the Restatement of Contracts contrasts with the substantially limited
statements of the UCC and the Restatement (Second) of Contracts. Compare 4 S. WILLISTON, A TREATISE ON THE LAW OF
CoNrAcrs § 631, at 951-53 (3d ed. 1961) and RESTATFtENTOFCoNTRAcTS §§ 237-240(1932) with U.C.C. § 2-202
(1978) and RESTATE-%iENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS §§ 209-216 (1981).
73. Damagka, Presentation of Evidence and Factflnding Precision, 123 U. PA. L. REV. 1083 (1975); Frankel, The
Search for Truth: An Umpireal View, 123 U. PA. L. REV. 1031 (1975); Lind, Thibaut & Walker, Discovery and
Presentation of Evidence in Adversary and Nonadversary Proceedings, 71 MICH. L. REV. 1129 (1973).
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terpreted "according to the understanding that a reasonable person of the same kind as
the other party would have had in the same circumstances." This provision diverges
from the one cited above, for it proposes to ascertain meaning through an objective
reading of the agreement by a reasonable person. Note that the reasonable person is
not one in the position of the utterer, but one in the position of the person to whom the
communication is made. This may simply be a statement of the familiar principle that
interpretation should be contra proferentem, that is, against the interest of the utterer
who was the master of the communication. 74 At least one influential commentator has
suggested that something more was meant and that the interpretation should take into
consideration any deficiencies in the understanding of the kind of person to whom the
statement was made.75
The question that remains is when to apply one half of article 8 and when to
apply the other. The answer depends on the means by which it is decided whether one
party to the contract "knew or could not have been unaware" of the other's intent. The
obvious place to look would be the sources enumerated in article 8(3), which states
that in determining the understanding of a reasonable person, due consideration
should be given to "the negotiations, any practices which the parties have established
between themselves, usages and any subsequent conduct during the course of per-
formance." But article 8(3) appears to limit the use of this evidence to the purpose of
"determining the intent of a party or the understanding a reasonable person would
have had," a rather careful formulation which appears to exclude determination of
whether a "party knew or could not have been unaware what that intent was."
Similarly, English and American attitudes differ significantly on the use of
subsequent conduct as an interpretative tool, yet the Convention, as Professor
Honnold recognizes, does not clarify its position on this matter.76 The role of customs
and usage emerged with a comparable lack of clarity in article 9. Accordingly, two
leading American scholars have expressed doubt that the Convention allows the use
of custom in interpretation.
77
2. Compromises Reached by Including Two Inconsistent Provisions: Articles 14
and 55, and Open Price Terms
In this country and other industrialized nations sales contracts for long-term
supplies often provide the basic terms of the relationship, but leave the price and
quantity of goods open to be adjusted in light of the parties' experience. The UCC
explicitly authorizes contracts with open price terms as well as output and require-
ments contracts, 78 although they had been subject to attack under previous common
law. 79 In French law there is also some hostility to such arrangements, particularly
74. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 206 (1981).
75. Date-Bah, supra note 66.
76. J. HoNNOLD, supra note 2, § 111.
77. Berman & Kaufman, supra note 9, at 271-72.
78. U.C.C. §§ 2-305 and 2-306 (1978).
79. Corbin, The Effect of Options on Consideration, 34 YALE L.J. 571, 580-83 (1925), reprinted in ASSOCIATION
OF AMERICAN LAW SCHOOLS, SELECTED READINGS ON THE LAW OF CONTRACTS 434, 443-45 (1931); Patterson, "Iluit-
sory" Promises and Promisors' Options, 6 IOWA L. BULL. 129, 209-14 (1921), reprinted in ASSOCIATION OF AMERICAN
LAW SCHOOLS, supra, at 401, 415-19 (1931).
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when they resemble a franchise or exclusive dealing contract and greatly dis-
advantage the weaker party. 80 Other European regimes seem more accepting of these
arrangements, referred to as "shell" contracts. In some socialist legal regimes,
however, these arrangements are invalid and deemed a threat to the security of the
agreement from the perspective of the superintending state planning agency. In that
kind of setting flexibility of price and delivery are not considered a virtue. Parties are
expected to conform to the plan.
These differing attitudes are primarily reflected in the part of the Convention
dealing with formation and particularly in article 14(1), which contains the basic
definition of an offer. This subarticle establishes two criteria for offers capable of
giving rise to a valid contract: intention to be bound and definiteness. The last
sentence of article 14(1) provides that the proposal is "sufficiently definite if it
indicates the goods and expressly or implicitly fixes or makes provision for determin-
ing the quantity and the price." Upon careful reading, this provision would appear to
render unenforceable open price and requirements contracts, although requirements
contracts might be found implicitly to make provision for determining the quantity.
In a later part of the Convention article 55 appears to undercut this conclusion by
providing that
[w]here a contract has been validly concluded but does not expressly or implicitly fix or
make provision for determining the price, the parties are considered, in the absence of any
indication to the contrary, to have impliedly made reference to the price generally charged
at the time of the conclusion of the contract-for such goods sold under comparable
circumstances in the trade concerned.
The language of this article appears directly keyed to article 14(1) and seems to
undercut the earlier provision. Experts who participated in the diplomatic negotia-
tions disagree about the import of their compromise.
8 1
3. Compromises Reached by Leaving Disagreements Unmended: Article 7 and
Good Faith and Fair Dealing
The inclusion of a provision creating an obligation of good faith and fair dealing
was the occasion for extensive and obscure dispute between common-law, con-
tinental, and socialist representatives. All sides recognized the multiple meanings of
good faith and the differing connotations the doctrine possesses in different legal
systems. 82 The president of the diplomatic conferences has noted, "[I]t was widely
thought that the rule was vague, or at least would remain vague for a long time and,
80. E.g., Judgment of Dec. 13, 1982, Arrdt No. 1062, Cass. civ. comm., Fr.; Judgment of May 25, 1981, Arrgt
No. 535, Cass. civ. comm., Fr.; Judgment of May 25, 198 1, Arrt No. 536, Cass. civ. comm., Fr.; Judgment of Apr. 27,
1981, Arrt No. 417, Cass. civ. comm., Fr. (all available on LEXIS, Prive library, Cassci file).
81. At the 1983 Parker School Conference, supra note 6, Professor Allan Farnsworth suggested that article 55 is
essentially an empty set since it applies, according to its opening clause, only in cases "where a contract has been validly
concluded," and an agreement with an open price is not based on a valid offer. Under this interpretation the ambit of
article 55 would be limited to those signatory nations that choose, under article 92, not to adopt the formation provisions
of the Convention. Professor Denis Tallon took a less restrictive approach to article 55, although it is clear that the
compromise reached, however unclear, has been obscured by the inclusion of two incompatible articles in the Convention.
82. Section 1-203 of the UCC states: "Every contract or duty within this Act imposes an obligation of good faith in
its performance or enforcement." U.C.C. § 1-203 (1978).
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because of the laconic language of [the Convention], would never become unambig-
uous."
83
At the very least, good faith is an interpretative tool that precludes a party from
unduly rigorous insistence on the right to terminate after a minor deviation in per-
formance by the other. 84 Viewed somewhat more expansively, it imports affirmative
obligations on the parties to communicate during performance and to cooperate in the
cure of defects and the modification of obligations in unforeseen circumstances. It
precludes a perfect tender approach to interpretation of the seller's obligations of
delivery and does not treat minor deviations by either side as an event that terminates
the contract.
In continental and socialist systems the concept may have broader connotations.
In particular, the notion of good faith is not limited to the performance of completed
agreements, but extends to the process of formation. It operates as a limit on the right
of a party to terminate the formation process. It is not possible to say whether this
potentially mischievous concept is part of the final product. Professors Honnold and
E6rsi think it is,85 Professor Farnsworth disagrees.8 6 Professor Eirsi characterizes the
final compromise thus: "[A]lmost everybody thought it a strange compromise, in fact
burying the principle of good faith and thus covering up the lack of compromise."
87
4. Compromises Reached by Covering Over Persistent Differences with Rhetoric:
Article 16 and the Revocability of Offers
Problems of formation have been treated as distinct by the international unifiers
of contract law. For several decades the strategy was to propose a distinct convention
on formation, which was in fact the format of the conventions of the 1960s.88 The
new Convention treats the formation articles as a severable part of the document.
Article 92 permits signatories to exclude part II, dealing with formation, from their
ratification.
83. Edrsi, supra note 21, at 349.
84. Cf. Parev Prods. Co. v. I. Rokeach & Sons, Inc., 124 F.2d 147 (2d Cir. 1941).
85. J. HONNOLD, supra note 2, § 94.
86. A. Farnsworth, Remarks at the 1983 Parker School Conference, supra note 6.
87. E6rsi, supra note 21, at 349. After describing the subsequent manoeuvering on the issue at the diplomatic
conference of 1980, Professor E6rsi concludes, "The result was strange but gained for the principle of good faith a
foothold in an international convention for unification of law. It is hoped that this meager result represents a modest start."
Id.
Two other Convention provisions demand at least passing mention under this heading, although the limitations of this
Article do not permit their full discussion. For a review of article 78 on the payment of interest, see infra text accompany-
ing notes 112-16 & note 114. Professor Barry Nicholas, who was an active participant in the British delegation at the
negotiations, opens his rather ambivalent discussion of article 79 on supervening events with these cogent observations:
It is true that at the international level, as at the national, the disagreements which are ultimately the most
intractable are those relating to legislative policy. However, at the international level an identity of formulation
may conceal a failure to agree on policy, and conversely, what appears to be a disagreement on policy may be no
more than a difference in choice of concepts. One must be on the lookout for superficial harmony which merely
mutes a deeper discord and for verbal conflict which hides a fundamental identity of aim. In both cases the key
lies in the conceptual presuppositions of each system or family of systems. The deeper discord escapes notice
because the same formula means different things according to the framework in which it is read; the fundamental
agreement on the end to be achieved is not seen because the conceptual routes which lead to that end are
different.
Nicholas, supra note 21, at 231.
88. ULIS, supra note 16; ULF, supra note 17.
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The legal systems of the world have dramatically different attitudes toward the
process of forming a legally binding agreement. Some demand a great deal of formal-
ity and that the process of negotiation be crowned by a ceremony that clearly marks
the moment of agreement. The most common formality is the writing, which most
advanced Western nations have abandoned. Ironically, it is the United States, with its
sentimental attachment to the Statute of Frauds, and the socialist regimes, which
place a high priority on the security of state planning agencies, that continue to
defend the writing as the requisite of a binding contract. 89 Articles 12 and 96 of the
Convention permit states that require contracts of sale to be evidenced by a writing to
exclude article 11, which states that contracts under the Convention need not be
concluded in or evidenced by writing, or subject to other requirements of form.
Finally, article 4(a) excludes from the concerns of the Convention the validity of the
contract, which presumably includes matters of duress, fraud, and the abuses of the
formation process encompassed by the concept of unconscionability in American
law. In each of these instances the drafters appear to have sought to avoid definitive
resolution of conflicts of contract formation by allowing signatory nations to insist on
their own approach. To the extent that this occurs, however, unification and
harmonization are abandoned at the threshold.
Much more troubling is the failure of the Convention to identify the points in the
sales transaction at which the parties' freedom to withdraw is significantly limited.
Identification of the moment in the course of negotiation at which it is too late to turn
back produces the most significant variations in attitudes toward formation. At one
extreme is the rule that until a formal written contract is executed the parties are not
bound by their discussions and remain free to terminate them without penalty. At the
other extreme is the notion that opening negotiations is an invitation to enter a
relationship and a commitment to pursue the process of bargaining in good faith,
which includes the obligation to carry that process to its logical conclusion, that is, to
give the other side a chance to make a sale or a purchase. Under this view it is bad
faith or oppression to enter the market unless one intends to buy;90 when one makes
an offer, one impliedly gives the other side a reasonable time to consider it and
respond. The making of an offer therefore binds the offeror to leave it open until the
other side has had a chance to respond.
Both of these attitudes influence most legal systems to some extent, and the
tension between them is played out in formation rules of substantial complexity. For
example, in the last several generations in the United States the common-law attitude
that left negotiators largely unbound until a completed contract was concluded has
been softened by rules that make offers firm and irrevocable. This has been accom-
plished by statute or judicial construction of open-ended concepts such as promissory
estoppel. 9' Despite these changes, American law still requires the formation process
89. The United States does not appear prepared to reserve its right to perpetuate the rule that contracts for sale be in
writing when it ratifies the Convention. The President's letter of transmittal to the Senate does not raise this possibility.
President's Message, supra note 1.
90. Rabbinic law has held this view for several millenia. Mishnah, Baba Metzia 4:10.
91. See, e.g., U.C.C. § 2-205 (1978); N.Y. GEN. OBLtG. LAW § 5-1109 (MeKinney 1978). See also Drennan v.
Star Paving Co., 51 Cal. 2d 409, 333 P.2d 757 (1958); Hoffman v. Red Owl Stores, 26 Wis. 2d 683, 133 N.W.2d 267
(1965); REsTTEiEx'r (SECOND) or CO TRACTS §§ 82-94 (1981).
OHIO STATE LAW JOURNAL
to be quite advanced before the liberty of the parties to abandon the deal is signifi-
cantly limited.9" Apparently this tension is also felt by other legal systems, although
it is of course expressed in different doctrinal terms.
The parties to an international transaction are likely to approach these questions
from national experiences and legal cultures that engender quite different ex-
pectations. Yet the Convention's formulations are not likely to help the parties in a
specific situation by indicating when it is too late to withdraw. Part of the problem is
the retention of the abstract structural formalism of the concepts of offer and accept-
ance. The Convention has retained the classical doctrine that there is something
called an offer which evokes a reciprocal communication called an acceptance and
that the conjunction of the two produces a contract. This familiar perspective creates
problems because most significant commercial transactions are not marked by offers
and acceptances but by a stream of partial, conditional, and contingent com-
munications that only gradually ripen into a firm and definite deal. A strictly
formalistic approach to formation would require that an offer be a piece of paper with
the word "offer" at the top of it in large type and that that paper be matched with a
similar piece of paper marked "acceptance" to form a contract. But no modern system
in the world takes this approach to the sale of goods.
Article 14(1) of the Convention identifies two earmarks of the offer: it must be
sufficiently definite and it must indicate the intention of the offeror to be bound in
case of acceptance. According to that article, the offer must indicate the goods to be
sold and expressly or implicitly fix, or make provision for determining, the quantity
and the price. Moreover, proposals addressed to more than one person are presumed
to be invitations to make offers, not actual offers, unless a contrary intention is
shown.
The problem with this approach should be manifest. The question of intention
and of indications of intention raises the whole problem of cultural expectations about
which no worldwide agreement exists. As a result, the provisions of the Convention
defining an offer and its revocability are unclear. This indefiniteness is not due solely
to the lack of clarity or conflicting nature of the terms of the Convention, but to the
fact that different parties continue to entertain conflicting understandings of what the
terms mean. The compromise on the good faith provision discussed earlier also
serves to obscure questions of formation. It is clear that key participants in the
negotiations believed that the good faith provisions of article 7 import to some extent
a notion of good faith in formation that presents additional, and for Americans
unfamiliar, limitations on the right of a party to withdraw before the formation
process is complete.
5. Compromises Reached by Procrustean Solutions: Article 35 and
Conforming Goods
A formal statement of contract rules like the Convention can help illuminate the
consequences of a failure of performance by (a) delineating the risks that buyers and
92. E. FARNSWORTH, CoNTRACTs § 3.17, at 148-51 (1982); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRAcTs § 42, at
113-15 (1981).
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sellers are assumed to undertake in the absence of a different contractual allocation,
(b) advising a disappointed party what legal remedies it can expect, and (c) advising a
disappointed party at what point during the course of unsatisfactory performance it
can terminate its own obligations and avoid the agreement. In the Anglo-American
experience these areas are among the murkiest, and even the reformulations of the
UCC and the Restatement (Second) of Contracts provide at best only limited
guidance.93 The Convention's approach to these problems also leaves difficulties
unresolved, but it does arrive at some intriguing innovations in dealing with the
puzzles of performance and breach. Unfortunately, this novel approach glosses over
the untidy parts of the problem.
Common-law attempts to describe the quality of the goods that will conform to a
contract have been confused by a welter of conflicting analytical approaches. Without
pausing to consider each in detail, Anglo-American law demands that a seller deliver
what was promised and that there be a perfect tender of the promised goods. 94 The
same body of rules is also concerned with, and treats separately, warranties and
affirmations of fact, whether express or implied, that create obligations to deliver
goods with certain characteristics. When the goods fail to meet the expectations of the
buyer, the seller's liability may be greater if it is found that the seller guaranteed or
represented the goods to have the characteristics said to be lacking. In some circum-
stances, the seller may be liable for innocent misrepresentations about the goods.
Article 35 of the Convention achieves a sensible unification of these overlapping
ideas that appears to be an improvement over American law. Insofar as the Conven-
tion treats the obligations of the buyer and the seller inter se the solution should work.
The glaring weakness of the resolution, however, is the Convention's failure to deal
with the question of who can assert the breach of these obligations by the seller.
Goods pass from hand to hand in the chain of distribution, while the complexities of
warranty and guarantee law are largely concerned with the liability of sellers to
persons other than the immediate purchaser of the goods. It is not clear what position
the Convention takes on product liability to remote vendees and third parties who
suffer losses because of nonconforming goods. Personal injury claims are excluded
from.the coverage of the Convention by article 5. Article 4 states that the Convention
governs only the formation of the contract of sale and the rights and obligations of the
seller and the buyer arising from such a contract. This provision has been the subject
of little commentary, perhaps indicating that domestic rules of product liability are
left intact for third party claims, although presumably buyers and sellers would be
limited to their rights under the Convention.
95
IV. THE CONVENTION AND THE FUTURE
Were the points made up to now in this Article the whole of the matter, one
might be tempted to stifle one's doubts and plunge bravely into the future of a world
93. Rosctt, Contract Performance: Promises, Conditions and the Obligation to Communicate, 22 UCLA L. REV.
1083 (1975); Rosett, Partial, Qualified, and Equivocal Repudiation of Contract, 81 COLUM. L. REV. 93 (1981).
94. U.C.C. § 2-601 (1978).
95. Professor Honnold avoids this issue in his treatise with the incontrovertible observation that the problem is
"'elusive, and can best be considered in a specific context." J. HONNOLD, supra note 2, § 62.
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governed by one unified set of unsatisfactory contracts rules. The gaps this Article
has pointed out in the Convention as drafted could be filled in, the errors corrected by
later amendments, and the holes plugged by the process of judicial interpolation so
familiar to Americans. But these corrective measures would be hard pressed to deal
with the most problematic aspect of the Convention structure, the way it deals with
the future. In their zeal to unify sales law the drafters created a comprehensive code,
but cut it off from national processes of lawmaking without devising workable in-
ternational substitutes. The discussions during the long process of negotiation were
devoted almost exclusively to reaching agreement on doctrinal statements of contract
law, as if it were thought that once agreement was reached on the text the law would
be a static and unchanging monument. This is both unfortunate and unnecessary. It is
possible to accept an unsatisfactory text if one is confident that it can be improved
with experience. Conversely, one's expectations of a text must be higher if the
opportunities for growth are frustrated. The inadequacies of the structure created by
the Convention undoubtedly mirror more general problems with decisionmaking in
the organs of the United Nations. They also reflect wide divergence among national
traditions on the appropriate roles of courts and continuing code reform.
Nonetheless, the failure to make some provision for the future was unnecessary.
As the text of a comparable convention on contracts, adopted by the EEC in the same
year as the Convention was signed, indicates, the contract law of nations may be
harmonized in a number of ways that respect the need for further development after
adoption of a common text. 96 While some of these devices may be more suitable for
the relatively compatible cultural climates of the European community than for the
diversity of the United Nations, a number of them should have been considered by the
drafters and would have provided significant room for growth.
The Administration proposes that the Convention become the law of the United
States through a simple process of treaty approval by two-thirds of the Senate,
without its implementation as domestic law by act of Congress. This process of
ratification appears unique in the substantial history of adoption by the United States
of law harmonization conventions and will aggravate the limitations in the Conven-
tion's structure for correction, filling gaps, clarification of ambiguities, and growth
through experience. While this process has constitutional dimensions, the emphasis
should be on its imprudence. Experts entertain divergent attitudes about the con-
stitutionality of extending the treaty power to its extreme limits or the wisdom of a
major displacement of state legislative competence in the direction of federal and
international lawmaking, but few would reach the conclusion that the Convention
provides a workable structure for future organic growth of the law.
A. The Convention's Insistence on Uniformity and Exclusivity
The Convention's very broad jurisdictional reach includes essentially all sales
transactions between persons with places of business in different contracting states.
Subject to the limited exceptions of the first five articles, the Convention fully
96. See infra text accompanying notes 103-09.
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occupies the field, excluding all national law in these transactions. Only by a de-
nunciation of the Convention, which itself would be a breach of our national
obligations, 97 could Congress change individual provisions of the law applying to
transactions within the ambit of the Convention. Moreover, it is unlikely that Con-
gress readily would intervene in this area in which neither Congress nor committee
staffs have extensive experience. The technical aspects of the code demand familiar-
ity before even an intrepid legislature begins to tinker with it. These considerations
presumably weighed heavily in the decision not to adopt the UCC as a national code
for transactions affecting interstate commerce. In recent decades Congress has had
notable difficulty in dealing with the challenges of code revision in taxation, patents,
securities regulation, copyright, and other areas of national legislation. The overrid-
ing political issues that occupy the time and talent of Congress foreclose detailed
consideration of technical areas like these. If issues of contract damages and avoid-
ance of performance are left to congressional oversight, it is very likely that they will
not be addressed. While many state legislatures are not better suited than Congress to
deal with these matters, fortunately, some state legislatures have taken the lead on
major issues of commercial law, consumer protection, and the like. The process of
state law revision has proceeded effectively and on the whole in sound directions.
Ratification of the Convention would totally strip the states of legislative com-
petence by operation of the supremacy clause. 98 Following the Senate's advice and
consent and the President's ratification, potential state and federal legislative over-
sight and correction will be effectively eliminated. This is precisely the effect in-
tended by the drafters, who limited the power of national reservation in article 98 and
left no scope to national divergence once accession to the Convention has occurred.
B. The UNCITRAL Decision Structure
Although the Convention denies national competence to modify the rules, it
does not recognize any supranational body to exercise these functions. No in-
ternational tribunal is given the power to interpret and interpolate. More surprising is
the failure to grant to any ongoing body the power periodically to review and put
forward modifications, improvements, and amendments. The Convention does not
establish anything equivalent to the Permanent Editorial Committee which oversees
the UCC and periodically proposes needed changes. UNCITRAL itself does not
possess any ongoing competence under the text of the Convention. This is un-
derstandable since UNCITRAL has a rather obscure structure and uncertain de-
97. Article 101 of the Convention permits denunciation of part II, part III, or the entire Convention, but permits
neither selective reservations at the time a state enters the Convention (article 98) nor selective denunciation of specific
provisions. But see Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, art. 44, opened for signature May 23, 1969, [1968-69]
Official Records of the United Nations Conference on the Law of Treaties, U.N. Doe. A/Conf.39/27,288, reprinted in 63
AM. J. INT'L L. 875 (1969) and 8 L.L.M. 679 (1969) [hereinafter cited as Vienna Convention]. Although the United States
has not ratified it, the Department of State has stated that it considers the Vienna Convention a codification of customary
international law and thus authoritative for interpretation of international agreements. 1973 DtGESr OF UNITED STATES
PRACTICE IN INTERNATIONAL LAW 307-08, 482-83.
98. U.S. CONST. art. VI, § 2.
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cisional authority:99 its decisions take the form of recommendations and reports to the
Secretary General of the United Nations, or, as in the case of the adoption of the
Convention itself, to a diplomatic conference called by the General Assembly.
0 0
If, for example, it becomes obvious to a broad cross section of the governments
concerned that article 14(2) of the Convention was a mistake and needs to be revised,
the Convention has established no mechanism for this purpose, nor is any apparent
UNCITRAL mechanism empowered to change the text or propose changes to signa-
tory nations. A diplomatic conference of the sixty-two signatory nations could be
convened, but without the unanimous agreement of all contracting parties the Con-
vention would stand unchanged, even though the modification might be effective
among the agreeing parties inter se under article 90.101
In short, the Convention creates no mechanism for change consistent with the
maintenance of the unity that is the prime justification for its existence. This limited
capacity for growth is hardly workable. Were a diplomatic conference convened, its
chances of producing significant changes would be slim. Predictably, this process
would produce only changes that create no controversy or that no party deems a
suitable trading point. In view of the inertia that would have to be overcome to
convene a diplomatic conference in the first place, the class of changes that could
succeed would appear to be virtually nil.
This rigid structure, with its limited capacity for national development within a
harmonized framework, was not inevitable. From the beginning of American
participation, as an observer, in the project leading to the Convention in the 1950s,
the American delegates pointed out these problems and suggested the adoption of a
more flexible approach resembling the highly successful model statutes used in this
country. 102 Beginning in 1967 the members of the EEC labored to produce a Conven-
tion on the Law Applicable to Contractual Obligations (EEC Contract Convention).
The final product was opened for signature in 1980 and immediately was signed by
seven of the EEC's nine members. ' 0 3 The EEC Contract Convention resembles the
United Nations convention in that both attempt to harmonize rules to which national
systems have taken divergent approaches that are deeply imbedded in their own legal
cultures. In contrast to the United Nations convention the European effort includes a
variety of devices that encourage continuation of the process of harmonization and
maintenance of the essential unity of direction, while providing latitude for correc-
tions, improvements, and expansions on the basis of continuing national ex-
99. The General Assembly resolution creating UNCITRAL is Resolution 2205 (XXI), 21(3) U.N. GAOR (1447th
plen. mtg.) (Agenda Item 88) at l, U.N. Doc. A/6594 (1966), reprinted in [1968-70] 1 Y.B. Irr'L TRADE L. CoMm'N
65, U.N. Doe. AICN.91SER.A11970. A brief but illuminating history has been provided by Professor Honnold. Honnold,
supra note 32, at 207-11.
100. The Convention Conference was convened by General Assembly Resolution 33/93. G.A. Res. 93, 33 U.N.
GAOR Supp. (No. 45) at 217, U.N. Doe. A/33/45 (1978).
101. Article 90 provides: "This Convention does not prevail over any international agreement which has already
been or may be entered into and which contains provisions concerning the matters governed by this Convention, provided
that the parties have their places of business in States parties to such agreement." Convention, supra note 1, art. 90.
102. Nadelmann & Reese, supra note 57.
103. Convention on the Law Applicable to Contractual Obligations, opened for signature June 19, 1980, 23 O.J.
EUR. COMM. (No. L 266) 1 (1980), 2 COMMON MKT. REP. (CCH) 6312-48 (1983); [hereinafter cited as EEC
Convention]; I. FLETcChER, CONFLICT OF LAWS AND EUROPEAN COMMUNITY LAW 147 (1982).
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perimentation. To this end the European convention (a) contains a declaration that the
parties will consider referring all disputes to the European Court and will have their
representatives meet at regular intervals; 10 4 (b) recognizes the continuing power of
the states to legislate the subject matter of the convention, but requires that they
coordinate new legislation through the Secretariat and delay amendments pending
consultation;10 5 (c) contemplates and establishes a procedure for revision of the
convention; 10 6 (d) provides a ten-year lifespan for the convention, with five-year
renewal periods;' 017 (e) commits member states to uniformity of interpretation and
application;10 8 and (f) establishes a procedure for consultation and composition if a
member state enters another international agreement which another member consid-
ers prejudicial to the unification achieved by the convention.' 0 9
C. Growth by Judicial Interpretation
Limited potential for legislative growth may not distress the seasoned common
lawyer, for until this century commercial contracts were the subject of only the most
limited legislative attention. The Convention might be seen as a return to the grand
tradition of the common law, in which judges working with incomplete and very
general legislative direction fashion world jurisprudence, much as was done with the
law merchant long ago."1
The Convention takes no position on the major issues of jurisprudential process,
that is, it explains very little about the role, if any, contemplated for authoritative
judicial interpretation. Whether judges hearing cases under the Convention are under
a special obligation to decide future cases consistently with earlier cases is unclear.
By its form alone the Convention is a code, in the sense that term is used in con-
tinental and socialist systems, rather than a detailed set of decisional rules like the
UCC. "' For this reason, broad interpretation by scholarly treatises, judicial reason-
104. EEC Convention, Joint Declaration, supra note 103, 2 COMMON MKT. REP. (CCH) 6347-48 (1983).
105. Id., art. 23, 2 COMMON MKT. REP. (CCH) 6335 (1983).
106. Id., art. 26, 2 COMMON MKT. REP. (CCH) 6338 (1983).
107. Id., art. 30, 2 COMMON MKT. REP. (CCH) 6342 (1983).
108. Id., art. 18, 2 COsoN MKT. REP. (CCH) T 6330 (1983).
109. Id., art. 25, 2 ComtorN MKT. REP. (CCH) 1 6337 (1983).
110. Every man knoweth, that for Manners and Prescriptions, there is great diversitie amongst all Nations: but
for the Customes observed in the course of trafficke and commerce, there is that sympathy, concordance, and
agreement, which may bee said to bee of like condition to all people, diffused and spread by right reason, and
instinct of nature consisting perpetually.
G. MALYNES, LEX MERCATORIA 3 (1622 & photo, reprint 1979).
On a more recent note, Professor Berman has observed:
In no other major branch of law is there more uniformity among the principal legal systems of the world
than in the law of intrrnational sales. Contract law relating to documentary transactions, the law of carriage of
goods by sea, rail, and air, the law of marine insurance, and the law of bank credits and acceptances, are
basically the same in their general character-so far as international sales are concerned-in the so-called
"common law" and "civil law" systems as well as in the legal systems of the centrally planned economies of the
Soviet Union, Eastern Europe, and China.
Berman, supra note 9, at 354.
111. E6rsi, supra note 21, at 336-37; E6rsi, Problems of Unif'ing Law on the Formation of Contracts for the
International Sale of Goods, 27 Am. J. Comp. L. 311,315 (1979). Professor Farnsworth has discussed this matter with
reference to earlier drafts of the Convention. Farnsworth, Formation of International Sales Contracts: Three Attempts at
Unification, 110 U. PA. L. REv. 305, 310-11 (1962). See also J. MERRYMAN, THE CIVIL LAw TRADMON, ch. 5 and 7
(1969).
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ing by analogy, emphasis on conceptual analysis, and other continental interpretative
techniques are to be expected. This concept also suggests less emphasis on common-
law stare decisis, the following of past judicial authority with attention to decisions
turning on the factual circumstances of prior cases.
The differences in these traditional approaches to interpreting a statutory text are
easily overstated. Anglo-Americans, Europeans, and judges in socialist states all are
called upon to interpret code provisions, and the results usually are quite sensible,
despite their differing explanations of the process. Nonetheless, these differences do
persist, and without some guidance from the Convention's text or its legislative
history it is difficult to see what interpretative responses should emerge. Without such
guidance the predictability of case decisions cannot be enhanced or carried across
borders.
Consider the position of a judge presiding at a trial, the issue being the meaning
of article 78 of the Convention, which deals with the extent to which a party is
entitled to interest on failure to pay the price or other sum due. The text of the article
is uninformative, 1 12 although it does indicate a general intention that interest shall be
payable on arrearages. Professor Honnold explains that the rules on interest generated
sharp differences of view and reversals of opinion which persisted to the very end of
the negotiating process, resulting in the obscurities of the final provision." 3 The
interpretative task thus is not a simple matter of giving specific meaning to the text on
the, basis of its words, for the meaning of the article is uncertain and gives no
indication when and how interest is to be computed. Moreover, the drafter's in-
tentions as revealed in the legislative history and the discussions leading up to the
final document are not helpful." 4 These will reveal that the delegates disagreed and
that the appearance at the last moment of the provision in its final form was an
obvious effort to cover over the deep and persistent disagreement. Nor is the hypo-
thetical judge likely to be assisted by recourse to domestic law. It is quite clear that
the drafters explicitly intended to preclude such reference. In any event, in many
nations and many states of this country," 5 interest of this kind is not allowed. Local
law therefore can provide little guidance.
In this situation the hypothetical judge would look to article 7, which provides
directions for interpeting the document. 16 Article 7(1) points to three considerations:
the Convention's international character; the need to promote uniformity in its appli-
S12. Article 78 provides: "If a party fails to pay the price or any other sum that is in arrears, the other party is entitled
to interest on it, without prejudice to any claim for damages recoverable under article 74." Convention, supra note 1, art.
78.
113. J. HONNOLD, supra note 2, §§ 420-422.
114. Cf. Vienna Convention, supra note 97, art. 32 ('Recourse may be had to supplementary means of interpreta-
tion, including the preparatory work of the treaty and the circumstances of its conclusion," in cases of ambiguity,
obscurity, absurdness, or unreasonableness.).
115. 5 A. CORBIN, CORBIN ON CONTRACTS §§ 1045-1052 (1964).
116. Article 7 provides:
(I) In the interpretation of this Convention, regard is to be had to its international character and to the need
to promote uniformity in its application and the observance of good faith in international trade.
(2) Questions concerning matters governed by this Convention which are not expressly settled in it are to
be settled in conformity with the general principles on which it is based or, in the absence of such principles, in
conformity with the law applicable by virtue of the rules of private international law.
Convention, supra note 1, art. 7.
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cation; and the observance of good faith in international trade. The first and last items
do not shed much light on the problem, nor does the need for uniformity in applica-
tion. Since most of the signatories to the Convention have only partial systems for
reporting court decisions and since they generally do not recognize the binding force
of precedent, it will be quite difficult for the judge to learn how the Convention is
being applied elsewhere. Turning to article 7(2), the judge is advised that "matters
governed by this Convention which are not expressly settled in it are to be settled in
conformity with the general principles on which it is based or, in the absence of such
principles, in conformity with the law applicable by virtue of the rules of private
international law." This provision makes clear that the principles on which the Con-
vention is based have priority over any reference to rules of law applicable by virtue
of the conflicts provisions of private international law. Therefore, the first step would
be to determine what general principles, if any, are applicable. The Convention does
not indicate where these general principles are to be found, and the task appears
formidable considering the contradictory systems from which the Convention is
drawn.
The United Nations Treaty Convention suggests that the preamble is to be used
as a guide to treaty interpretation." 7 The Preamble to the Convention contains only
one specific reference and that is to the United Nations Resolutions on a New
International Economic Order. It is doubtful that the grandiloquent rhetoric of those
resolutions can provide much reliable guidance for the judge."18
As Professor E6rsi suggests, it may not be a fault that the Convention contains
so few principles, 119 but then it is a poor guide for those faced with the concrete task
of giving meaning to the words. Article 7 seems to express the wish that the broad
terms of the Convention be filled in over time by a world common law, a shared body
of interpretation that would supply a gloss on the text. But the Convention does not
suggest how such a body is to grow, given the different traditions of jurisprudence,
the different authority accorded judicial utterances in different systems, and the
conflicting social and economic systems underlying the law.
D. The Process of Ratification by the United States
The process for adopting the Convention contemplated by the Administration
raises two distinct issues. First, adoption of the Convention requires a reallocation of
legislative competence between the states and the national government. Transactions
that had been integrated within the general framework of commercial law and left to
the states are now to be treated as a special class of international transactions, subject
to international rules adopted by the national government. Second, the Administra-
tion proposes that this change be made by exercise of the treaty power, without
having Congress consider implementing legislation. Each of these issues possesses
117. Vienna Convention, supra note 97, art. 31(2).
118. Declaration on the Establishment of a New International Economic Order, May 9, 1974, G.A. Res. 3201, 29
U.N. GAOR Supp. (No. 1) at 3, U.N. Doc. A/9559 (1974), reprinted in 13 I.L.M. 715 (1974); Programme of Action on
the Establishment of a New International Economic Order, May 16, 1974, G.A. Res. 3202, 29 U.N. GAOR Supp. (No.
1) at 5, U.N. Doc. A/9559 (1974), reprinted in 13 I.L.M. 720 (1974).
119. E6rsi, supra note 21, at 336-37.
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constitutional dimensions which must be placed in context. Too often, constitutional
allocation of governmental functions is treated exclusively as a question of power.
Admittedly, these issues are most likely to arise in this context as part of the great
confrontations leading to decisions by the Supreme Court of the United States. But it
is important to note that the traditional allocation of power between the states and the
federal government, or the limits, if any, on the treaty power of the executive
vis-a-vis the other organs of national government are not senseless, arbitrary di-
visions of responsibility. The modem understanding of the commerce power certainly
provides a flexible basis for federal legislative activity. The possibility also exists in
the minds of the fearful that with the advice and consent of two-thirds of the Senate,
the President of the United States can make treaties that eliminate virtually all domes-
tic legislation. 120 Yet, if one treats the question whether the Supreme Court will strike
down the statute on such grounds as the end of the constitutional discussion, one will
fail to see that, beyond its function of allocating governmental power, the Constitu-
tion provides guidance on wise governmental action. Were a majority of the Justices
of the Supreme Court to accept that congressional power under the commerce clause
may control the farthest reaches of local economic activity, it would not necessarily
mean that this extension of federal power would be the wisest course, nor that the
Constitution does not suggest where prudent lines should be drawn.
1. The Commerce Power
The Convention draws some jurisdictional lines that are hard to reconcile with
the American constitutional scheme. Jurisdiction under the Convention is not trans-
actional since nothing about the sale itself triggers its provisions. Instead, jurisdiction
is based on an aspect of the personal status of the parties, the location of their place of
business. The Convention does not apply to goods shipped from nation to nation in a
sale between citizens of different nations if their places of business are in the same
nation, but it does apply to the sale of goods that never leave the United States entered
into by two American citizens if one of them has his or her place of business in
another country. Indeed, the jurisdiction of the Convention does not even depend
ultimately on the personal status of the parties, but instead upon how one party should
have perceived the personal status of the other. 121 These rules are likely to produce
neither authoritative predictive judgments nor uniformity of result.
Recent decisions of the Supreme Court evince substantial deference to con-
gressional judgments when the Court perceives that international commerce is in-
volved. 122 The conjecture that the Court would not strike down the Convention as an
intrusion on the reserved powers of the states 123 does not mean that this is the wisest
120. The broad extent of this power and its possible limits are suggested by Reid v. Covert, 354 U.S. 1 (1957);
Missouri v. Holland, 252 U.S. 416 (1920); Sutherland, Restricting the Treaty Power, 65 HARV. L. Ruv. 1305 (1952).
121. Under article I of the Convention, jurisdiction rests on the existence of parties "whose places of business are in
different States." Convention, supra note 1, art. 1(1). Under article 10 of the Convention, ifa party has a place of business
in more than one State, the jurisdictional determination is to be made "having. regard to the circumstances known to or
contemplated by the parties at any time before or at the conclusion of the contract." Id., art. 10.
122. Scherk v. Alberto-Culver Co., 417 U.S. 506, 515-18 (1974); The Bremen v. Zapata Off-Shore Co., 407 U.S.
1 (1972).
123. U.S. CONST. amend. X.
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course. The allocation of power between the national government and the states to
make legal rules in commercial matters reflects two centuries of experience demon-
strating that the organs of state law are better qualified to deal with these issues. This
is the practical teaching of Erie Railroad v. Tompkins. 1
24
The major loss in this transfer of power would be the creative role of state
judges, and federal judges sitting in diversity, in commercial law cases. Those read-
ers who set a great store on the tenth amendment to the Constitution may find a
residual constitutional category of state power on which the national government may
not encroach. Those who find less substance in the tenth amendment may nonetheless
decide that, since the Convention offers so uncertain a guide to legislation, such
substantial opportunities for confusion, and so little affirmative benefit from adop-
tion, the prudent course for the national government would be to stay out of this area.
2. The Treaty Power
Treaties made pursuant to the Constitution are the supreme law of the land and
directly displace preexisting state and national law without further legislative action.
This approach contrasts with English law, which views the making of treaties as an
exercise of sovereign prerogative for the Crown without parliamentary participation,
but does not make treaties part of the internal law of England without implementing
legislation. 125
Despite this basic legal approach, the practice in the United States has been to
adopt international conventions which have an impact on domestic law by simulta-
neous ratification and the adoption of a statute. 126 It is unclear why the Administra-
tion decided to depart from long-standing practice in this instance. For at least three
practical reasons it would be preferable to reconsider this decision and resubmit the
Convention both for ratification and as a statute. First, the process of statutory
enactment by both houses of Congress entails greater substantive review, which may
well provide the occasion for fuller study and improvement of the law finally
adopted. Second, as with the Hague rules embodied in the Carriage of Goods by Sea
Act, 12 7 the English text of the Convention would be adopted as the law of the United
States. Article 101(2) of the Convention provides that the Arabic, Chinese, English,
French, Russian, and Spanish texts constitute a single original, all of which are
equally authentic. Inevitably, the various versions of the Convention are not perfectly
faithful to each other since subtle nuances will elude even the most highly skilled
translators. Professor Honnold makes it clear that some shades of meaning diverge in
the present text because of the negotiating process rather than any lack of translating
124. 304 U.S. 64 (1938).
125. European Communities Act, 1972, ch. 68, §§ 1-4 and sched. 1-3. See H.P. Bulmer Ltd. v. J. Bollinger S.A.,
[1974] Ch. 401 (C.A.); Blackburn v. Attorney-General, [1971] 1 W.L.R. 1037 (C.A.).
126. For example, the Hague Rules are embodied in the Carriage of Goods by Sea Act, 46 U.S.C. §§ 1300-1315
(1976 & Supp. V 1981), and domestic legislation implementing the United Nations Convention on the Recognition and
Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards may be found at 9 U.S.C. §§ 201-208 (1982). The history of the adoption of the
Carriage of Goods by Sea Act is recounted by A. KNAUTH, THE AMERICAN LAW OF OCEAN BttLS OF LADING 118-31 (4th
ed. 1953).
127. See supra note 126.
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skill. 128 Given both the limited availability of non-English United Nations materials
in this country, even in depository libraries, 29 and the limited foreign language
ability of American judges, it would be desirable to eliminate any need for recourse to
foreign language materials to discover what American law is. This can be accom-
plished by enactment of the Convention in its English version.
Third, enactment of the Convention as a statute would create greater possibilities
for modifying the Convention in light of experience by national legislation, without
reconvening an international conference. The internal coherence of the law dealing
with similar transactions might be maintained better by leaving power to modify in
the same hands as those responsible for legislation regarding commercial transactions
in general.
V. CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS
The process of negotiating the Convention has extended over half a century.
During that time the nature of the problem itself has changed. At the outset it seemed
a good idea to promote trade through a unifying codification of national legal re-
gimes. During the intervening period economic integration has proceeded rapidly and
has supported a number of important harmonizations of law. These have reduced the
substantive anomalies that concerned Professor Rabel thirty years ago.' 30 The need
for a unified doctrinal statement of contract principles is therefore less essential than
it appeared at the beginning of the project.
This diminished urgency is reflected in the slightly outdated character of some of
the issues that most concerned the drafters. The definitions of offer and acceptance
and the careful delineation of the mailbox rules hardly seem at the cutting edge of
128. J. HONNOLD, supra note 2, § 124.
The Secretary to the UNCITRAL Working Group on the International Sale of Goods and a legal officer serving the
Working Group have provided eloquent testimony to the problems of translation:
The most obvious difficulty which arose during the history of art. 46 was its mistranslation from French to
English. Much has been written about the difficulties of interpreting multilingual legal texts where the different
language versions are not identical. Less has been written about the impact of such discrepancies on the
negotiation process. It is obvious that much of the misunderstanding of art. 46 during its preparation arose out of
its mistranslation.
There are many ways for divergences in the different language versions to occur. Sometimes the text in the
original language does not permit precise translation. Sometimes the text is misunderstood by the translator.
Sometimes typographical errors are not caught by proofreaders who do not know the subject matter.
These divergences must be isolated and corrected as early as possible so that in the subsequent stages of the
drafting process all the participants are working with the same text. There is only one way in which this can be
accomplished. The various language versions must be rigorously compared by persons who are concerned with
the substance of the project. This is a tedious task, but ideallyit should be done each time the text is revised. If it
is not, the quality of the comments and proposals of the participants, and therefore of the legal solution on which
they finally agree, will be adversely affected.
Bergsten & Miller, The Remedy of Reduction of Price, 27 Am. J. COMP. L. 255, 276 (19791.
129. It is very difficult to find non-English UN materials at even the largest law libraries in North America. For
example, during the course of writing this Article the author sought to check the English text of a provision against the
French counterpart. Several UN depository libraries in the western United States were unable to provide the French text,
nor was the Convention text carried on the French Journal Officiel service of LEXIS, although France has ratified the
Convention. The UCLA Research Library sought to borrow the text from the United Nations Library at headuarters in
New York, but that library also was unable to locate a French text. After a number of frustrating weeks a French text
finally was obtained by mail from the UNCITRAL library in Vienna. No attempt was made to obtain the presumably less
common Chinese or Arabic texts.
130. Rabel, supra note 15.
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contemporary concern. At the same time the Convention does not deal with many of
the contemporary issues of commercial law considered important in this country and
abroad. For instance, the Convention does not directly address the complex of prod-
uct liability issues that are intimately connected to other doctrinal rules announced by
the Convention. Similarly, as one knowledgeable commentator has observed, the
treatment of supervening events in article 79 is an exercise in "superficial harmony
which merely mutes deeper discord. '1 31 The possible connotations of the key phrase
in article 79, which provides an excuse for impediments beyond a party's control, are
myriad. The conclusion is inevitable that the negotiators did not agree on the meaning
of this provision; thus, the Convention cannot claim to unify the law on this subject.
Therefore, the Convention is not instructive on how the obligations of parties are
affected by rapid inflation, changes in world price levels, or by monetary fluctuations
that may interfere with the parties' performance. The Convention also provides no
unifying guidance on the host of issues subsumed within the rubric of validity under
article 4. The definition of "validity" continues to divide the commentators who
participated in the drafting process and cannot avoid becoming a source of great
mischief. Validity does include, however, the body of mandatory provisions of law
that deal with all those current issues of contract law thought significant enough to be
the subject of modem legislation.
A significant weakness of the Convention lies in its creation of a separate
substantive law for international transactions, particularly in view of the amorphous
quality of the category. World economies have reached a point of integration at which
a clear economic distinction between foreign and domestic trade no longer exists,
except perhaps in those state controlled economies in which the distinction is main-
tained by reposing authority over foreign trade in a special ministry that operates
under a plan separate from that for the domestic economy.
For the sophisticated international trader the Convention holds few perils. Arti-
cle 6 permits sophisticated parties to draft their way out of any undesirable provisions
or to choose not to be governed by the Convention at all. It is the small, un-
sophisticated dealer who is most likely to assume that the same rules apply to all
sales, whether foreign or domestic, and who is least likely to have a lawyer to advise
the exclusion of the Convention by contract. Individuals of this kind are most likely
to find themselves burdened with unknown or unknowable rules.
There are several factors that the United States should consider in choosing its
course. First, ratification of the Convention should await more careful study of its
provisions than has occurred to date. The Convention has not aroused much detailed
attention from the practicing or scholarly branches of the legal profession. The
resolution of a few major issues awaits the adoption of the Convention. In view of the
difficulty of making subsequent changes, time to study specific provisions carefully
now would be well spent.
Second, particular attention should be given to the utility of part 11 of the
Convention, dealing with formation of the contract. Article 91(2) provides for res-
131. Nicholas, supra note 21, at 231; see J. HONNOLD, supra note 2, §§ 423-427.
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ervations to part II. The precise benefits to the United States of adopting this set of
rules, which does not appear in any significant respect superior to our existing law
under article 2 of the UCC, should be examined. This question crystallizes the issue
of the lengths to which the United States should go in the interest of participating in
the international project.
Third, Congress and the President should reconsider the wisdom of ratifying this
Convention under the treaty power, without implementing domestic legislation.
Again, no advantage to this procedure nor any precedent for so significantly un-
dercutting state legislative authority is apparent. Any advantages to this approach
should be made explicit and balanced against the costs. Among the advantages of
implementing a convention of this sort by legislation is the clear indication that
Congress undertakes responsibility for continuing supervision of this subject matter.
This responsibility can be exercised by simple legislative act or by delegation of
power to the states without denunciation of the whole Convention. Legislation would
also establish a single authoritative text in English.
Fourth, the possibility of retaining some continuing role for the states should be
studied. It would be desirable to coordinate the international transactions rules and
the rules that govern other contracts, particularly since the Convention does not treat,
or exclude from its coverage, many issues of great contemporary concern. An
alternative to retaining a role for the states would be for Congress to federalize the
whole body of commercial law, which it may be empowered to do under the com-
merce clause. It seems doubtful, however, that national opinion would favor such a
course.
Preserving the state role may be accomplished by either of two different
approaches. One is provided by the EEC Contract Convention, which permits local
legislatures to continue to make rules in the subject area of the convention, but
requires them to suspend implementation of any laws pending consultation and
coordination with a central agency. A second approach is suggested by article 93 of
the Convention, which provides in pertinent part:
If a Contracting State has two or more territorial units in which, according to its
constitution, different systems of law are applicable in relation to the matters dealt with in
this Convention, it may, at the time of signature, ratification, acceptance, approval or
accession, declare that this Convention is to extend to all its territorial units or only to one
or more of them, and may amend its declaration by submitting another declaration at any
time.
This Article suggests that the Senate might proceed with some form of ratification on
a national basis, but at the same time declare that implementation of the Convention
within any state must await appropriate state legislative action.
Fifth, the process of ratification may be subject to reservations, despite the
strictures of article 98, which limits reservations to those provided in the text of the
Convention. Although this approach would give the ratification by the United States a
strange status in international law, it would create few practical difficulties. For
instance, the act of ratification might explicitly indicate that the United States deems
the Convention applicable only to international sales transactions. Strong legislative
[Vol. 45:265
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history could make clear the intention that the goods actually move across borders,
perhaps drawing upon some of the jurisdictional language of ULIS.
Finally, Congress may decide that adoption is simply not justified and that the
Convention does not deserve ratification at this time. A project that has taken a
half-century can take a few years longer. This approach would place the United States
in an uncomfortable position, for it is already a signatory of the Convention and the
executive is under an implied obligation to seek ratification.
32
Perhaps needed most is an opportunity for critical reflection on the benefits and
costs of this kind of law harmonization. If it has not been possible after this period of
time to produce a comprehensive and exclusive text on contract rules, then maybe the
process of law harmonization should be directed toward more flexible and hopeful
strategies. As suggested throughout this Article, law harmonization depends neither
on the displacement of national law nor on an exclusive or comprehensive statement
of doctrinal concepts. Pragmatic harmonization has been proceeding at a much faster
pace in the world of business than conceptual harmonization has proceeded in the
academic worlds primarily concerned with the project that produced the Convention.
A unified, exclusive, and comprehensive statement of the law applicable throughout
the world is a commendable goal for legal harmonization, but it is a poor method for
reaching that end. The nations of the world are unlikely to arrive at substantive
agreement by accepting a uniform conceptual statement of the rules. True harmoniza-
tion would be better promoted by building a framework within which diverse legal
systems can work and grow together and within which all nations are encouraged to
develop compatible rules through common experience. The Senate should carefully
consider whether ratification of this Convention will promote the long-term goal of a
coherent and sensible world legal order for commercial transactions.
132. Vienna Convention, supra note 97, art. 18.

